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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the rapid economic growth in China, income inequality has widened, especially 
between the urban, eastern coastal provinces and rural inland areas due to unbalanced 
economic development and different access to resources. Inequality in education and 
health are correlated with income inequality, and in turn affects people’s human capital 
and ability to work, further reinforcing the income inequality. In Chapter I, I explore to 
what extent is inequality of years of schooling in China from half a century ago to 
nowadays affected by circumstance factors rather than personal effort. I decompose 
inequality into between group inequality (inequality of opportunity which is determined 
by circumstances) and within group inequality. I apply China Family Panel Studies 
(CFPS) 2016 follow up survey data to compare the results with the previous study and 
discuss relative policy implications. I find inequality for the opportunity constitutes 29% 
of the educational outcome inequality on population born from 1940 to 1994 and hukou 
is the most influential circumstance factor. In Chapter II, I investigate the 
environmental factors that cause child stunting inequality in China. I apply China 
Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) data from 1989 to 2011 to measure stunting 
inequality by concentration index and decompose changes in inequalities. I find the 
notable income growth in China reduces average stunting level. However, increased 
income exaggerates stunting inequality by increasing income inequality’s contribution 
to stunting inequality. In Chapter III, I explore to what extent is inequality well-being 
as represented by body mass index (BMI) attributable to intra-household inequality, 
whether the health resource deprivation exists among family members, and whether a 
Kuznets curve relationship between intra-household inequality and average well-being 
exists. From available data from CHNS, I find intra-household inequality accounts for 
more than a half of outcome inequality, and no clear pattern of deprivation among 
family members nor Kuznets curve relationship has been found.   
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CHAPTER I 
INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY FOR YEARS OF EDUCATION IN CHINA 
FROM 1940 TO 1994 
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Introduction 
Beginning with the end of the 20th century, China is experiencing a social 
transformation with unprecedented influence, speed, and scope. China’s economy has 
expanded rapidly and stably since the economic reform and opening was initiated 1978. 
The per-capita GDP attaied an annual growth of 6.7%1 from 1978 to 2008. Educational 
attainment has also markedly increased in China, especially at the postsecondary level. 
The college enrollment rate boomed in the late 1990s, and the rapid increase of 
educational attainment is both the result of the economic development, and fuels 
continuing growth.  
 
Figure I.1(a). Trends in GDP and per-capita GDP, 1952-2008 (in 2008 RMB) 
Note: Adjustment has been made for the data of 2005-2008, on the basis of the 2d 
Economic Census. 
Source: Stat Bureau of Statistics. 2010. China Statistical Abstracts 1949-2008. China 
Statistics Press.  
 
 
 
                                                   
1 GDP growth rate without inflation, China Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics 
of China  
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Figure I.1(b). Percentage change of China real GDP 1961-2008.  
Source: World Bank 
 
 
 
Figure I.2. Higher education expansion in China, 1949-2007. 
Source: China Education Yearbook Editorial Board (1984, 1986-1988, 1989-2008)   
 
In China, education is considered the fairest way for children rising from different 
socioeconomic backgrounds to compete in the job market and pursue success. Through 
the ages, education is one of the most concerning topics in politics that it relates the fate 
of individuals to the long-term development of the whole country (Benos and Zotou, 
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2004; Kunofiwa, 2017; Delalibera and Ferreira, 2019). Therefore, Chinese government 
takes educational affairs seriously and funds expended on education constitute a 
substantial portion of the budget. Despite the heavy investment, social mobility is 
slowing down, and individual effort seems to have less impact on educational 
attainment. The interview of the top scorer in 2017 college entrance examination 
(Liberal arts, Beijing area) drew widespread criticism when he considered himself 
benefiting from the privileged family socioeconomic status and enjoying the “shortcut” 
of living in Beijing and accessing to the best educational resources in China.  
Therefore, despite the overall outcome improvement, it’s also essential to look into 
inequality during the process. Equity theory (Adams, 1963) points out that individuals 
are motivated by fairness, and if they identify inequities of themselves, they will seek 
to adjust their input to reach their perceived equity, and hence influence the political 
stability and economic development. In Chinese history, the Cultural Revolution was 
an extremally radical approach to pursue equal redistribution, and it  resulted in severe 
economic and educational recession. As many political philosophers (Rawls, 1958) 
considered, inequality is acceptable only when it results from different levels of effort, 
a personal responsibility. A concept in developing economics “equality of opportunity” 
(EOp) is developed by economists including Dworkin (1981), Arneson (1989), Cohen 
(1989), Roemer (1993, 1998) and Checchi and Peragine (2010). The central idea of this 
concept is dividing the causes of inequality into fair causes and unfair causes, in this 
case, effort and circumstance. Populations with the same circumstances are grouped 
into finite types composed by circumstance factors such as gender, ethnicity, family 
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income, parental education, etc. Outcome is presented by a utility function determined 
by effort and a set of social policies, which is considered the average achievement 
obtained among people in a typical type. The inequality in outcome can be decomposed 
into between group inequality and within group inequality. Within group inequality is 
determined by effort and policy since each group has identical circumstance factors and 
the between group inequality represents the inequality of opportunity.  
Another reason to look into inequality is its relationship between the overall outcome 
mean. Kuznets (1950) proposed a hypothesis that as economy develops, the inequality 
first increase and then decreases, forming an inverted-U shape curve. So even the mean 
outcome is improving, it is possible that the population is more unequal, and a growing 
proportion of the population fall below the minimum threshold (a “poverty line”). The 
third reason to investigate inequality is that inequality in one indicator may be causal 
for other forms of inequality (for example, in Chapter III we discuss stunting inequality 
will further affect educational attainment and income). 
The literature on measuring inequality of opportunity has many theoretical and 
empirical applications on various topics including income, education, health etc. (De 
Barros et al., 2009; Van de Gaer, 1993; Ferreira and Gignoux 2011) Applications in 
China include Golley and Kong (2018) in education, Zhang and Kanbur (2005) on 
spatial inequality in education and healthcare, and Zhang and Eriksson (2010) in 
income. Golley and Kong’s work find inequality of opportunity contributes 
33.4%~39.3% to total educational inequality. Zhang and Kanbur’s work point out 
increasingly polarized urban-rural illiteracy rate from 17.8 in 1981 and 25.7 in 2000. 
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As for health outcomes, the gap between rural-urban infant mortality rate rose from 1.5 
in 1981 to 2.1 in 2000. Zhang and Eriksson discover income inequality of opportunity 
rises continuously from 46% to 63% in 1989-2006. 
Previous researches to explore the educational inequalities in China include Liu (2006), 
Wu and Huang (2015), and Zhou et al. (1998). Liu (2006) uses a Cox proportional 
hazard model to assess the possibility of people from different class backgrounds got 
enrolled into higher education. Wu and Huang (2015) show Blinder Oaxaca 
decompositions of gender disparities in educational outcomes. Zhou, Moen and Tuma 
(1998) focus on urban China and uses logistic regression model to calculate the 
probability of attaining each level of education (junior high, senior high and college) 
across class backgrounds, gender, region and family size. However, none of the 
information currently available indicates how educational inequality of children with 
different circumstances has changed over time and how changing circumstance factors 
have impacted on the distribution of educational outcomes. Recent research by Golley 
and Kong (2018) analyzes data from the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) survey in 
2010 and 2012 to investigate the influence of circumstance factors on education 
outcome inequality represented by years of schooling. They also explore how the 
proportion of inequality caused by circumstance factors change by time. The purpose 
of this article is to explore circumstances factors and examine to what extent does 
inequality of years of schooling in Chins from half a century ago to nowadays affect by 
circumstance factors rather than personal effort. I build my work on their study and 
apply CFPS 2016 follow up survey data to compare the results and discuss relative 
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policy implications. 
 
Literature 
a. Inequality of opportunity 
Roemer’s study (1993, 1998) was considered one of the foundations of measuring 
opportunity of equality. A generalized entropy model was applied to calculate 
“accountable effort”. Populations with identical circumstances are grouped into finite 
types composed by circumstance factors such as gender, ethnicity, parental political 
status, parental education, etc. Ideally, in each type, the advantage outcome y should be 
determined only by personal effort. The decomposition of total inequality can be written 
as: 
𝐸𝛼(𝑦) = 𝐸𝛼({𝜇𝑘
𝑖 }) + ∑
𝑛𝑘
𝑁
𝐾
𝑘=1
(
𝜇𝑘
𝜇
)
𝛼
𝐸𝛼(𝑦
𝑘)                                     (1) 
where nk and yk denote, respectively, the population and the advantage distribution in 
type k, and α is the generalized entropy parameter. The first term in the right-hand 
side of this equation—the between-group component—is inequality in the smoothed 
distribution. The second term is the within-group component. 
One remarkable achievement from Roemer’s work was to recognize some part of effort 
is determined by circumstance factors, like policy taken in a particular group. He 
defines the distribution of effort (e) within each type 𝐺𝜌
𝑘(𝑒) conditional on certain 
policy ρ, and denotes the advantage level y enjoyed by a person in quantile π =𝐺𝜌
𝑘(𝑒) 
in the effort distribution of type k, given policy ρ, as 𝑦𝑘(𝜋, 𝜌). Roemer proposed that 
individual located at the same centile among within group distributions should receive 
same outcome: 𝑦𝑘(𝜋, 𝜌) =  𝑦𝑙(𝜋, 𝜌). Assuming a monotone increasing utility function 
- 8 - 
 
for personal effort, “opportunity-equalizing policy” can be solved from maximizing the 
average outcome of most disadvantaged group: 
𝜌∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∫ 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑦𝑘
1
0
(𝜋, 𝜌)𝑑𝜋 
The “strong criterion” definition of equal opportunity requires identical distribution 
across types, while the “weak criterion” definition only expects the mean outcome level 
to be identical across types (Van de Gaer, 1993). Lefranc et al. (2008) applies stochastic 
dominance rankings conditional on types under strong criterion and claim the strong 
criterion only holds when no type stochastically dominants another type. The weak 
criterion calculates inequality of opportunity as the between group inequality when 
suppressing the within group inequality. The sample size required in weak criterion is 
less than strong criterion and allows to consider more circumstances empirically. This 
study was the foundation of many other related studies conducted in various subjects.  
Other than decomposing total inequality into within and between group inequalities (the 
later term is referred to inequality of opportunity), Bourguignon, Ferreira, and 
Menéndez (2007a) consider outcome variable a function of circumstances and effort 
and estimate the importance of opportunity‐forming circumstances in accounting for 
earnings inequality. The circumstance component is further decomposed into a direct 
effect and an indirect effect that operates through the influence of circumstances on the 
choice of efforts. They decompose overall earnings inequality in Brazil into race, 
parents’ education, father’s job and location. They also estimate the lower bound of the 
measurement considering the unobserved circumstances. The observed circumstances 
are found to account for between 10%~37% of the overall inequality. 
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A substantial amount of literature has adopted the concept of inequality of opportunity 
and apply it in a wide range of economic outcomes: income, expenditure, education, 
health, etc. For example, Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) construct a scalar measure of 
inequality of opportunity and apply to six Latin American countries. The study applies 
comparison between within-group inequality and between-group inequality, where 
between-group inequality was considered unfair inequality due to predetermined 
circumstances. The findings reported that inequality of opportunity constitutes ⅕ ~ ⅓ 
of total income inequality and ¼ ~ ½ of total consumption inequality. The study implied 
that the differences between nonparametric and parametric methods are statistically 
irrelevant.  
Far less has been done in measuring inequality of opportunity in education area. One 
application in educational inequality of opportunity is from De Barros et al. (2009). 
They use PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) standardized score 
in Latin American and conclude inequality of opportunity contributes 14~28% of the 
total outcome inequality, explained by circumstance variables including parents’ 
education, father’s occupation, gender and location. Also applying PISA score, Ferreira 
and Gignoux (2000, 2003) find 27% ~ 33% of educational outcome inequality in 
Turkey and 35% of all educational disparity world widely is attributable to inequality 
of education. Golleg and Kong’s work (2018) is the first attempt to apply years of 
schooling as outcome of interest.    
b. Political implications 
Why does inequality of opportunity matter? Lv (2013) finds that public perception of 
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social fairness, especially equal access to education, positively affects the acceptance 
level of income inequality and the attitude towards redistribution. Education is one type 
of public good that affected largely by policies, and it is excludable to some extent. The 
disparity in education could occur in geographic level and individua level. Specially, 
eastern and coastal areas of China enjoy superior educational resources than central and 
western part of China due to historically imbalanced economic development. In each 
Province, their different entitlement rules limits admission of students from different 
locations, which usually favors local students than students out of province. Also, 
Hukou policy differentiates students with urban and rural hukou, which students with 
rural hukou usually are not able to enjoy same resources as urban students do even if 
they live in urban areas. Lv considers equal education opportunity an effective filter 
when assessing another person’s success, by placing everyone at the same starting line 
in a way. Because people typically don’t have details about how others achieve their 
success, the perception of equal opportunity, in this case, equal education opportunity, 
largely determines their assessment of whether others deserve their success or not, in 
turn determines their approval of redistribution policies among their society. The 
dissatisfaction towards redistribution policies and resentment towards income 
inequality would potentially impair social stability and hinder social development. 
Therefore, policies equalizing opportunities could help assuage the trouble of rising 
income inequality. And it should be the inequality of opportunity, not the inequality of 
outcomes that influence the design of such policies. 
The political agenda is highly correlated with China’s educational outcomes. Knight, 
- 11 - 
 
Sicular and Yue (2011) use CHIP 2007 survey data to examine the intergenerational 
dimension of educational inequality. The survey sample covers individuals born from 
1930s to 1980s, a period when China experienced huge economic and social change, 
including educational policies. When the People’s Republic of China was established 
in 1945, one goal was to reduce illiteracy, so universal education was popularized 
rapidly. In the First Five Year Plan (1953~1957), resources were devoted to secondary 
education to train skilled workers, as a part of Soviet communism strategy to develop 
heavy industry. From this phase, educational funding was inclined to urban areas, while 
rural schools were typically funded by local farm cooperatives. The Great Leap 
Forward in 1958 shifted education agenda with political agenda to “left”, a more 
aggressive communism model. Enrollment into primary level of education grew rapidly 
while curriculums showed more political tendency. By around 1960, some state funded 
key schools were formed, providing high quality education to those intelligent students 
with good political background. During the decade of Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) 
policies shifted to extreme left and universities were closed. Mass education was 
promoted with collective farming while elitism was disdained. Gaokao (national entry 
test to universities) was not resumed until 1977. Along with reform and opening policy 
starting from 1978, educational goals shifted from mass education to high quality 
education. Since then, China’s economy has grown dramatically, but with increasing 
inequality. Rich areas could better subsidize local schools whereas poor areas fell 
behind. Knight, Sicular and Yue find that from 1980s, educational inequality declines 
with rising overall education level, measured by Gini coefficient. Parental education 
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inequality only accounts for less than 20% of children’s educational inequality, and 
rural areas have lower contribution than urban. They also believe that class based social 
discrimination plays an important role in the drop out ratio, that is, children from poor 
family are more likely to drop out of school. Besides, studies in other countries find 
positive correlation between parental education and children’s education even if 
education is heavily subsidized 
 
Methods 
We follow Roemer’ approach and apply a generalized entropy model (equation 1) to 
calculate inequality. We also follow Golley and Kong’s article and treat years of 
schooling as economic outcome of interest. Because we use years of schooling as the 
key variable, we can only use GE(2) to deal with those individuals with 0 year of 
schooling. GE(0) and GE(1) that involve taking log value are more often used in income 
inequality decompositions (Golley and Kong, 2011). 
The approach is developed as follows. Consider a finite population of individuals, i ∈
{1,2, … , N} , and each individual achieves educational attainment 𝑦𝑖 , which is a 
function of vector on circumstances 𝐶𝑖 and effort 𝑒𝑖 . 𝐶𝑖 has J elements and each 
element of 𝐶𝑖
𝐽
  takes a finite value 𝑥𝐽 . Following Roemer (1998)’s approach and 
dividing the population with identical circumstances into K groups (types), and the 
partition π ∈ {𝑇1, … , 𝑇𝐾} , which distribution of 𝑦𝑖
𝑘  in each type k has identical 
circumstances: 𝐶𝑖 = 𝐶𝑗 , ∀𝑖, 𝑗/𝑖 ∈ 𝑇𝑘, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝑘. The maximum number of possible types 
?̅? = ∏ 𝑥𝑗
𝐽
𝐽=1 .  
We want to derive the inequality caused by difference in circumstances. The outcome 
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inequality measured in generalized entropy class can be decomposed into between 
group inequality and within group inequality. Between group inequality can be also 
written as:  𝐸0({𝜇𝑖
𝑘}) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝜇
𝜇𝑖
𝑘
𝑁
𝑖=1  . Considering each individual inside the 
“Roemerian” type has identical circumstances, the inequality caused by different level 
of effort is within group inequality while inequality of opportunity is between group 
inequality.  
The direct approach to measure the absolute scale of inequality of opportunity we 
suppress the within group inequality by assigning each individual the group mean and 
then measure the inequality of the smoothed distribution. 𝐼𝑂𝐴𝐷 = I{(𝜇𝑖
𝑘)} where 𝜇𝑖
𝑘 
is the smoothed distribution that replacing each outcome 𝑦𝑖
𝑘 with group-specific mean 
𝜇𝑘 . The relative measurement is the proportion of between group inequality over 
outcome inequality: 𝐼𝑂𝑅𝐷 = I{(𝜇𝑖
𝑘)}/I{𝑦𝑖}.  
The indirect approach suppresses the between group inequality by replacing individual 
outcome 𝑦𝑖
𝑘  with 𝑦𝑖
𝑘 𝜇
𝜇𝑘
 , where μ  stands for the grand mean and generates a 
standardized distribution 𝑣𝑖
𝑘 ,  which only leaves the within group inequality I{𝑣𝑖
𝑘} . 
Thus, between group inequality, also the indirect measurement of absolute inequality 
of opportunity is IOAI=I({yi}−I({vik}. similarly, the indirect relative term of inequality 
of opportunity is IORI=1−I({vik}/I({yi}). 
Foster and Shneyerov (2000) find only GE(0) satisfies path-independent 
decomposability axiom2 hence can achieve IOAD=IOAI, and IORD=IORI. 
                                                   
2 Just as a smoothed distribution eliminates all within-group inequality by construction, a 
standardized distribution eliminates all between-group inequality, by appropriately rescaling 
all subgroup means. One might wish to impose the requirement that I({𝜇𝑖
𝑘}) = I(y) − I({𝑣𝑖
𝑘}). 
This requirement is the axiom of path independent decomposability. 
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Applying OLS regression, the parametric analogue of inequality of opportunity 
measurement considers the advantage variable a function of circumstances, effort, and 
random unobserved circumstances y=f(C,e,u). While circumstances are defined as 
exogenous, effort can be influenced by circumstances and other factors. Thus, the 
expression can be written as y=(C,e(C,v),u). The reduced-form regression can be 
written as: 
𝑦 = 𝛽𝐶 + 𝜀                              (2) 
where y is year of schooling, C is a vector of circumstance variables and ε is the error 
term. We construct the prediction distribution with coefficients β and actual C: yi=Ciβ, 
with y replaced by its prediction. Since individual in the same group has identical 
circumstance vectors, the within group inequality is eliminated. Hence, we get the 
direct measurement of inequality of opponent: IOAD=I({y}) and IORD=I({y})/I({yik}). 
We can also construct the standardized distribution with coefficients β , mean of 
circumstances ?̂? , and counting within-group variation 𝜀𝑖 : 𝑦?̂? = ?̂? β    i. Replacing C 
with  ?̂? eliminates between group inequality and only leaves within group inequality. 
Hence, we have IOAI=I({yik}−I({?̂?}) and IORI=1−I({?̂?}/I({yik}) for indirect approach.  
We can also calculate partial contribution to total outcome inequality by suppressing 
circumstance with its mean value once at a time, and then calculating the remaining 
inequality in absolute and relative terms. Larger the partial inequality remains; smaller 
the circumstance’s contribution is. Golley and Kong’s article call such a distribution 
“counterfactual distribution”: 𝑦𝑖
𝐽 = 𝐶𝑖
𝑗≠𝐽𝛽𝑖 + 𝐶
−𝑗=𝐽𝛽𝑖, and 𝐼𝑂𝐴𝑃 = 𝐼({𝑦
𝐽}), 𝐼𝑂𝑅𝑃 =
𝐼({𝑦𝐽})/𝐼({𝑦𝑖
𝑘}). 
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To test the adequacy of OLS model, we need to test for the normality, multicollinearity, 
model specification, and homoscedasticity. Normality of residuals is only required for 
valid hypothesis testing and is not required in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the 
regression coefficients. The term collinearity implies that two variables are near perfect 
linear combinations of one another. As the degree of multicollinearity increases, the 
regression model estimates of the coefficients become unstable and the standard errors 
for the coefficients can get wildly inflated. A model specification error can occur when 
one or more relevant variables are omitted from the model or one or more irrelevant 
variables are included in the model. If relevant variables are omitted from the model, 
the common variance they share with included variables may be wrongly attributed to 
those variables, and the error term is inflated. On the other hand, if irrelevant variables 
are included in the model, the common variance they share with included variables may 
be wrongly attributed to them. Model specification errors can substantially affect the 
estimate of regression coefficients. OLS assumes that the variance of the error term is 
constant (homoskedasticity). If the error terms do not have constant variance, they are 
said to be heteroskedastic. In our case we expect heteroskedasticity to present because 
there are subpopulation differences (Williams, 20153), which violate the assumption of 
OLS. However, heteroskedasticity does not result in biased parameter estimates. 
Violation of the OLS assumptions will result in overestimated confidence intervals and 
underestimated p-value, and thus the statistical importance level of the independent 
                                                   
3 Richard Williams, University of Notre Dame, https://www3.nd.edu/~rwilliam/ Last revised 
January 30, 2015, page 2 
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variable may also be overestimated.  
Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) consider IOA and IOR the lower-bound of the inequality 
measurement because there probably exist some unobservable circumstances that 
influence the outcome inequality. The lower-bound result holds regardless the 
relationship between circumstances and effort. In their example, hours of study can be 
treated as unobserved effort which has no correlation with circumstance variables; or 
the effort corelated to circumstances (rural students study more in order to catch 
up/study less to help with housework), which will reflect in the biased weight (β) of 
observed circumstance: hukou. Therefore, we need to be cautious when interpreting the 
coefficients. 
 
Data 
a. CFPS 
Lead by the Peking University research team, the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) 
is an integrated national social survey that collects data on individual, family and 
community level. The project is implemented by the Institute of Social Science Survey 
(ISSS) at Peking University, assisted by University of Michigan and many other 
domestic government agencies , and funded by National Natural Science Foundation of 
China and Peking University. CFPS focus on economic and non-economic well-being 
of Chinese people. CFPS collects multi-level data to shape an individual’s life by 
building relationships inside the society. In the community level, political environment, 
infrastructure, access to resources, transportation, medical care, financial revenue and 
expenditure are collected. At the household level data are collected on family structure, 
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living conditions, social interaction, income and expenditure, composition of assets. 
Topics on education, occupation, marriage, income, physical and mental health are 
collected in the individual level. For children under 10 and family member who is not 
present, a proxy questionnaire is applied. The panel study tracks changes over time and 
allows researchers to follow the (dis)continuity of social phenomena.  
CFPS collects data in 25 provinces4 (municipalities/autonomous regions) that cover 
almost 95% of the Chinese population, hence is considered nationally representative. 
CFPS implemented Probability-Proportional-to-Size Sampling (PPS)5 with implicit 
stratification.  
In the 2010 baseline survey, CFPS interviewed 14,960 households, 33,600 adults and 
8,990 adolescents with an approximate response rate of 82%. The 2010 baseline survey 
uses face-to-face interviews and collects topics on economic activities, educational 
attainment, family relationship and dynamics, mental and physical health, etc. The full 
sample follow-up surveys (2012, 2014, 2016) conducted every 2 years after 2010 use 
both face-to-face and telephone interview to trace, adjust and update information on 
gene6 members interviewed in 2010 baseline survey. The follow-up survey also traces 
                                                   
4
 Half of the sample was generated by oversampling with five independent sampling frames 
(called ―large provinces‖) of Shanghai, Liaoning, Henan, Gansu, and Guangdong. The other 
half households were from an independent sampling frame composed of 20 provinces 
(called ―small provinces‖). Xie&Lu, 2015 
5
 CFPS user guide: “Administrative units and socioeconomic status (SES) were used as the 
main stratification variables. Within the administrative unit, local GDP per capita was used as 
the ordering index for SES. If the GDP per capita in the administrative unit is not available, the 
proportion of nonagricultural population or population density is used.” 
6 CFPS user guide: “All family members who were identified at baseline to have 
blood/marital/adoptive ties with the household were identified as CFPS gene members. In the 
follow-up surveys, newly born or adopted children of gene members were also considered 
CFPS gene members.” For non-gene members the individual survey will be terminated.  
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proxy questionnaire from the last round of survey. I use 2010 baseline survey and 2012- 
2016 follow up survey data in this study. Many survey questions I use in this study, 
such as parents’ education, are not included in the baseline survey but in the follow-up 
surveys.  
b. Educational outcome indicator  
I use years of formal schooling as the indicator of educational outcome, but due to 
unequal educational resources in different geographic locations and levels of schools, 
same years of education received do not necessarily mean equal education received. 
For example, colleges in China is divided into first tier, second tier and third tier (like 
community colleges in the U.S.), and inside the first-tier colleges there are “Project 
985”, “Project 211” and normal colleges. Students from the “Project 985” colleges are 
expected to receive the top-level educational resources and most popular in the job 
market with the highest potential income. The divergence between educational quality 
of the rural-poor and the urban elites further deepens the inequality in future 
competition. Oppedisano and Turati (2015) use standardized PISA score to measure the 
inequality of educational outcome in European countries. The standardized score can 
reflect students’ study ability, and it also reflects the level of personal effort with random 
error, hence it seems to be a better indicator. However, there are no data available at 
national level that reflect students’ learning ability and collecting such data requires 
significant amount of effort, considering China uses different teaching materials and 
examination systems in different regions. Likewise, the national college entrance exam 
score is infeasible because different enrollment policies are applied to students from 
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different regions and it excludes students who only receive senior high school and 
below level of education. In addition, a small but important subgroup is missed in the 
sample: the students who study abroad. According to the 2017 Studying Abroad 
Development and Trend Report7 , there are about 0.6 million students who studied 
abroad in 2016, accounting for 3% of the college enrollment number in the same time 
period. Though the subgroup is small compared to the total population, this subgroup 
stands for the students with either the highest study ability (those who survive the 
intense competition and receive national fund to study abroad), and/or the most 
advantageous family socioeconomic status (considering the cost of studying abroad). 
Not including this subgroup, we truncate the right tail of the distribution. Because we 
treat individuals receiving same years of education as a group, we could underestimate 
the within group inequality, so the “lower bound” estimation in this article has a certain  
reference value. 
c. Circumstances 
Many studies show that the most influential factor that causes and reinforces inequality 
in China is the unique hukou system. (Golley and Kong, 2012, 2013; Knight, Sicular, 
and Yue, 2012; Li, et al., 2015; Luo et al., 2011; Qiao, 2008; Wang et al., 2009; Wu, 
2009 and Yi et al., 2012). Hukou is a household registration system that prevents free 
movement of population and limits individual’s activity inside a certain geographic area. 
Hence, it influences individual’s access to pension fund, educational and health 
resources, especially between rural and urban division. In addition, intergenerational 
                                                   
7 Retrieved from http://www.eol.cn/html/lx/report2017/yi.shtml (in Chinese) 
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persistence in educational attainment can be realized by combination of better parenting 
skills, transmission of intelligence, more investment on education and better economic 
status positively correlated with parents’ higher educational attainment (Black and 
Devereux, 2011). During specific periods (during and after Mao’s era, 1945~1976), 
family class status (Chengfen, including proletariat, worker, landlord, Bourgeois, etc.) 
plays an important role in accessing educational resources. During the cultural 
revolution, educational policies discriminated against the families with high 
socioeconomic status. The class labels are abandoned in 1979, but we can still measure 
the effect of class status by parents’ Communist party membership. Much literature 
shows other circumstances not under an individual’s control, including sex (Zhang et 
al., 2012; Zhang and Chen, 2014), ethnic groups (Li et al., 2015; Yang and Wu, 2009), 
geographic regions (Zhang and Kanbur, 2005; Hannum and Wang, 2006; Heckman, 
2005) and sibling size (Li, Zhang, and Zhu (2008; Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009) all 
contribute to educational inequality.  
d. The data used in this study 
In this study I follow Golley and Kong (2018)’s article which studies population with 
birth years from 1940 to 1989 based on the 2010 CFPS baseline survey. For consistency 
in comparisons, I apply both 2010 baseline and 2012~2016 follow-up surveys, and 
analyze the population born from 1940 to 1994 (people born in 1994 should finish their 
education except for those who are pursuing a master/doctoral degree, which accounts 
for little percentage in the total population and thus have no substantial effect on the 
result).  
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I choose the following circumstance variables: hukou8 status (urban hukou=1, rural 
and other hukou=0); gender (male=1, female=0); father’s education level (illiterate is 
the excluded category, 3 dummy variables: primary school, junior high, and senior high 
and above); whether parents are Communist Party member (=1 if either of parents is 
member); number of siblings (only child is the excluded category, 2 dummy variables: 
1 or 2 siblings and 3 or more siblings); ethnicity (Han=1, minority=0); and residing 
provinces (Beijing is the excluded category). There are 17,250 valid data entries with 
all of the above information available.  
I choose father’s educational level as the representation of parental social status. 
Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) include both father and mother’s education in their study, 
but In China it appears a high degree of marriage matching (Grier et al. 2016), which 
results in high correlation between parents’ socioeconomic status, including educational 
background. Including both parent’s education level will bias the estimated coefficient 
because of the correlation between variables (Knight et al. 2012). Likewise, variables 
like parents’ occupation and income are not included. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
8 Hukou is a household registration system that differentiate households’ activity region. In 
China, children with rural hukou can only go to rural schools.    
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Results 
Table I.0. Similarities and differences between my analysis and Golley & Kong (2018) 
My analysis  Golley and Kong (2018) 
Similarities 
Gaps in average years of schooling: 
1.6 years between male and female, 
2 years for children whose parents with 
and without Communist Party 
membership, 
1.7 years between Han Chinese and 
ethnic minorities, 
3 years between only child and those with 
three or more siblings. 
Gaps in average years of schooling: 
1.4 years between male and female, 
2.2 years for children whose parents with 
and without Communist Party 
membership, 
2.3 years between Han Chinese and 
ethnic minorities, 
3.8 years between only child and those 
with three or more siblings. 
Below coefficients in OLS regression 
have positive signs and indicates 
individual with such circumstance 
variable may receive more years of 
schooling than baseline group in overall 
data. 
Urban hukou: 2 years more  
Male (until 1984): 1.6 years more  
Parents with Communist Party 
membership: 1 year more 
Father’s education in 3 higher levels: 2, 
3, 3.8 years more  
Effect of sibling size is inconclusive.  
Below coefficients in OLS regression 
have positive signs and indicates 
individual with such circumstance 
variable may receive more years of 
schooling than baseline group in overall 
data. 
Urban hukou: 3 years more  
Male (until 1984): 1.4 years more  
Parents with Communist Party 
membership: 0.8 year more 
Father’s education in 3 higher levels: 2, 
2.2, 3.2 years more  
Effect of sibling size is inconclusive. 
The relative measurement (direct and 
indirect) ranges from 22.4% (22.0%) in 
1955-59 cohort to 42.1%(38.1%) in 
1980-84 cohort. 
IORD (IORI) ranging from a low of 25.3 
(23.4) per cent for the 1960–64 cohort to 
a high of 42 (43.4) per cent for the 1981–
85 cohort. 
Top 3 contributors to educational 
inequality of opportunity are :father’s 
education, urban hukou, and province. 
Top 3 contributors to educational 
inequality of opportunity are :urban 
hukou, father’s education, and province. 
Differences 
I try to select the top 2 most important 
circumstance variables and form 8 types 
with sufficient observations in each type. 
Golley & Kong divide sample into 192 
types and leave 2/5 types with less than 1 
observation. 
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a. Descriptive statistics 
The average years of schooling shows an upward trend over the years whereas we can 
notice the gaps of year of schooling in different circumstances: 3.1 years between urban 
and rural hukou; 1.6 years between male and female; 2 years between parents with and 
without Communist party membership; 1.7 years between Han people and the 
minorities; 3 years between only child and those with 3 or more siblings. 
From the summary statistic (Table I.1), the overall average years of schooling shows an 
upward trend over the years, with the illiterate decreasing from about half of the 
population to less than 10%, credited to high quality implementation of 9-year 
compulsory education system starting 1982 . Except for the cultural revolution period 
(1966-1976), the rate of people with low education attainment (primary school and 
junior high school) declines while more and more people are able to receive education 
from senior high school and above, with a notable jump of more than 10% from the 
year cohort 85-89 to 90-94, credited to the college enrollment expansion policy starting 
in 1999.
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Table I.1. Descriptive statistics through different birth year cohort, for available provinces in China 
Circumstance Variables all 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 
#observation 17250 798 1408 1946 1835 2118 2534 2341 1591 1316 1365 1233 
Education(%)                         
Illiterate 27.4 46.6 46.0 46.1 36.9 21.4 26.2 23.2 15.7 10.0 7.2 7.2 
Primary school 22.0 26.1 28.0 22.3 13.9 18.1 27.7 25.9 21.1 19.6 16.6 11.9 
Junior high school 30.9 16.3 18.0 22.0 28.1 36.6 32.9 33.7 37.1 37.5 38.5 31.0 
Senior high school and above 19.6 11.0 8.0 9.6 21.1 24.0 13.2 17.2 26.0 33.0 37.7 52.5 
Average schooling (years) 6.7 4.5 4.3 4.5 6.0 7.4 6.4 6.9 8.2 9.2 9.7 11.4 
Father's Education(%)                         
Illiterate 49.3 77.8 72.2 69.9 62.7 58.5 50.5 37.6 28.7 21.4 16.7 15.3 
Primary school 28.1 17.7 20.1 21.1 26.8 27.0 29.8 36.1 38.7 29.2 25.9 22.2 
Junior high school 14.0 2.3 3.9 5.4 6.8 8.0 11.5 17.3 21.2 30.9 36.9 41.2 
Senior high school and above 8.5 2.3 3.8 3.5 3.7 6.5 8.2 9.0 11.5 18.5 20.5 21.2 
Father's average schooling (years) 4.0 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.7 3.2 3.9 4.9 5.7 6.8 7.4 7.8 
Hukou (Urban=1, %) 48.2 44.7 47.5 46.5 46.7 45.4 43.9 49.5 55.1 52.8 52.7 57.0 
Urban average schooling (years) 8.3 5.9 5.7 6.0 7.1 8.7 7.9 8.6 9.9 11.0 10.9 12.4 
Rural average schooling (years) 5.2 3.3 3.1 3.3 5.0 6.3 5.1 5.3 6.0 7.2 8.2 10.1 
Gender (Male=1, %) 48.7 55.6 52.6 51.1 50.1 47.0 47.4 46.4 47.8 46.9 47.5 51.0 
Male average schooling (year) 7.5 5.7 5.3 5.7 7.4 7.8 7.1 7.7 8.8 9.5 9.8 11.5 
Female average schooling (year) 5.9 2.9 3.3 3.3 4.5 6.4 5.7 6.2 7.6 8.9 9.5 11.4 
Parents party member (yes=1, %) 15.2 5.8 8.5 14.0 17.2 19.6 17.8 17.7 15.6 14.7 11.1 11.6 
Parents party member average 
schooling (year) 
8.4 5.7 5.3 6.1 7.2 7.9 7.9 8.7 9.9 11.6 11.6 13.0 
Parents non-party member average 
schooling (year) 
6.4 4.4 4.2 4.3 5.7 7.1 6.0 6.5 7.9 8.8 9.4 11.2 
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Ethnicity (Han=1, %) 92.4 92.7 93.8 93.9 93.6 93.9 92.6 91.9 89.9 89.8 90.8 90.5 
Han average schooling (year) 6.8 4.6 4.4 4.6 6.0 7.6 6.4 7.1 8.5 9.5 9.9 11.8 
Minority average schooling (year) 5.1 3.3 3.1 3.7 4.9 5.7 5.3 4.7 5.3 6.1 7.6 7.5 
Family size(%)                         
Only child 7.3 8.6 7.2 4.9 5.1 3.6 2.6 3.4 9.7 19.3 20.1 26.0 
One or two siblings 35.1 27.4 24.9 20.9 17.8 21.0 25.7 42.7 59.1 61.2 66.3 65.4 
Three or more siblings 57.6 63.9 67.9 74.2 77.1 75.3 71.7 53.9 31.2 19.5 13.6 8.7 
Only child average schooling (year) 8.8 3.8 4.2 5.2 5.6 6.8 5.8 7.4 10.4 11.9 11.9 13.4 
One or two siblings average 
schooling (year) 
7.7 4.3 4.0 4.5 6.5 7.5 7.5 7.8 8.5 9.1 9.4 11.2 
Three or more siblings average 
schooling (year) 
5.8 4.6 4.5 4.5 5.9 7.5 6.0 6.1 6.8 6.7 7.4 7.5 
Source: CFPS 2010-2016 
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Figure I.3. Trends in average years of schooling – rural/urban and gender divides by 
birth year cohort, for available provinces in China 
Source: CFPS 2010-2016 
 
 
Figure I.4. Trends in average years of schooling – parents political party and ethnicity 
divides by birth year cohort, for available provinces in China 
Source: CFPS 2010-2016 
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Figure I.5. Trends in average years of schooling – sibling size divides by birth year 
cohort, for available provinces in China. 
Source: CFPS 2010-2016 
 
Trends in average years of schooling by birth year cohort are presented by above figures. 
The urban-rural gap (Figure I.3) is relatively constant on and above 3 years. The gender 
gap (FigureI. 3) is constantly decreasing, from 3 years to almost 0. Traditionally, 
Chinese family value male children over girl children because of the culture norm (male 
is considered the true inheritor of the family), thus families allocate limited educational 
resources to boys. Because of the compulsory 9-year education policy and one-child 
policy, the gaps between boys and girls are disappearing. There are persist gaps (Figure 
I.4) between the Han ethnicity and the minorities, and between parents with or without 
the Communist Party membership. As for the relationship between sibling size and 
average year of schooling (Figure I.5), before the 1975-79 cohort, there is no clear 
relationship. Starting from the 75-79 birth cohort, children living in a family with less 
sibling size tend to enjoy more years of schooling. The one-child policy is initiated in 
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the late 1970s and early 1980s, and it penalizes families give birth to addition children. 
Hence families with multiple children tend to have more restricted educational 
resources to allocated for each child. Becker and Lewis (1973) believe that parents will 
choose to have fewer children to invest in the human capital, in order to achieve the 
higher quality of offspring. 
b. Regression results 
The regression result is calculated based on equation (2) y=βC   mentioned in Methods 
section to generate the parametrically standardized distributions. In this case y is years 
of schooling, C is a vector of circumstance variables including hukou status, gender, 
father’s education level, whether parents are Communist Party member, number of 
siblings, ethnicity, and residing provinces as mentioned in section Data (d). Except for 
the geographic dummies, all coefficients have expected signs and mostly statistically 
significant. 
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Table I.2. OLS regression of years of schooling on circumstance variables by birth year cohort, for available provinces in China 
Explanatory Variables all t 40-44 t 45-49 t 50-54 t 
Hukou (Urban=1) 2.046 30.39 1.816 5.65 2.215 9.89 2.120 10.61 
Gender (Male=1) 1.601 25.83 3.112 10.85 2.093 10.03 2.630 14.5 
Parents party member (Yes=1) 1.007 11.47 1.052 1.72 0.556 1.48 0.954 3.58 
Ethnicity (Han=1) 0.488 3.62 -0.602 -0.9 -0.582 -1.09 -0.0311 -0.07 
Father-primary school (Yes=1) 2.054 27.53 2.398 6.33 1.543 5.76 1.830 8.01 
Father-junior high (Yes=1) 2.999 30.81 2.548 2.64 1.765 3.27 1.409 3.46 
Father-senior high and over (Yes=1) 3.830 31.98 0.721 0.74 2.100 3.81 1.850 3.7 
One or two siblings (Yes=1) -0.288 -2.26 0.547 0.98 0.309 0.7 -0.656 -1.44 
Three or more siblings (Yes=1) -1.284 10.26 0.235 0.45 0.462 1.13 -0.777 -1.83 
Tiajing -0.735 -1.43 -8.968 -3.08 -1.838 -1.08 -4.123 -2.85 
Hebei -1.686 -4.39 -4.767 -2.45 -2.311 -1.68 -1.906 -1.79 
Shanxi -1.441 -3.67 -5.480 -2.78 -2.796 -1.95 -3.262 -2.98 
Neimenggu -2.005 -0.97 -  -3.458 -0.84 -  
Liaoning -1.268 -3.37 -3.412 -1.86 -1.387 -1.03 -1.527 -1.47 
Jilin -1.791 -4.25 -3.405 -1.6 -2.847 -1.82 -2.641 -2.2 
Heilongjiang -1.731 -4.33 -4.960 -2.37 -3.274 -2.28 -2.402 -2.12 
Shanghai -1.054 -2.77 -4.352 -2.37 -1.539 -1.15 -2.125 -2.04 
Zhejiang -2.371 -5.61 -5.450 -2.78 -4.834 -3.34 -5.076 -4.26 
Jiangsu -1.473 -3.42 -5.929 -2.67 -2.478 -1.59 -4.498 -3.46 
Anhui -3.583 -8.34 -7.913 -3.91 -5.326 -3.53 -6.384 -5.43 
Fujian -2.934 -5.59 -8.291 -3.61 -6.292 -3.61 -3.895 -2.66 
Jinagxi -2.828 -6.67 -5.457 -2.68 -3.249 -2.15 -3.718 -2.98 
Shandong -2.164 -5.59 -4.571 -2.36 -3.280 -2.38 -3.945 -3.72 
Henan -1.728 -4.61 -5.530 -2.99 -2.544 -1.9 -2.518 -2.42 
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Table I.2. continue: OLS regression of years of schooling on circumstance variables by birth year cohort, for available provinces in China 
Explanatory Variables all t 40-44 t 45-49 t 50-54 t 
Hubei -1.570 -3.57 -4.932 -2.32 -3.497 -2.29 -2.746 -2.18 
Hunan -0.877 -2.16 -4.234 -2.17 -1.595 -1.12 -1.596 -1.44 
Guangdong -2.252 -5.93 -6.443 -3.44 -2.904 -2.14 -3.045 -2.85 
Guangxi -1.865 -4.35 -5.986 -2.75 -3.968 -2.51 -3.619 -2.76 
Hainan -5.922 -2.87 -  -3.478 -0.85 -  
Chongqing -3.102 -6.41 -5.941 -3.01 -3.862 -2.55 -4.018 -3.02 
Sichuan -3.137 -8.03 -6.115 -3.18 -3.965 -2.87 -4.207 -3.87 
Guizhou -3.836 -9.19 -8.303 -4.21 -5.773 -3.93 -4.796 -4.05 
Yunnan -2.957 -7.28 -7.846 -3.42 -5.261 -3.44 -3.087 -2.49 
Xizang -  -  -  -  
Shan'xi -1.572 -3.78 -5.024 -2.48 -2.309 -1.58 -2.531 -2.16 
Gansu -3.085 -8.2 -6.563 -3.52 -3.462 -2.56 -3.794 -3.61 
Qinghai -1.912 -0.66 -  -  -  
Ningxia -  -  -  -  
Xinjiang -4.669 -2.75 -  -  -  
Constant 5.909 14.54 7.042 3.55 4.708 3.24 5.267 4.42 
Observations 17,250  798  1,408  1,946  
R-squared 0.291  0.311  0.252  0.268  
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Table I.2. continue: OLS regression of years of schooling on circumstance variables by birth year cohort, for available provinces in China 
Explanatory Variables 55-59 t 60-64 t 65-69 t 70-74 t 
Hukou (Urban=1) 1.533 6.75 1.861 9.88 1.988 12.11 2.310 13.6 
Gender (Male=1) 2.899 13.97 2.039 11.79 1.447 9.58 1.531 9.7 
Parents party member (Yes=1) 0.930 3.31 0.931 4.19 1.019 5.08 1.199 5.72 
Ethnicity (Han=1) 0.286 0.58 0.860 2.19 0.355 1.1 1.257 3.76 
Father-primary school (Yes=1) 1.289 5.31 1.510 7.4 1.769 9.93 1.424 7.56 
Father-junior high (Yes=1) 1.197 2.84 1.490 4.53 1.854 7.37 2.149 9.04 
Father-senior high and over (Yes=1) 1.556 2.78 2.195 6 2.753 9.34 3.441 11.31 
One or two siblings (Yes=1) 0.778 1.49 0.756 1.54 1.131 2.31 0.533 1.2 
Three or more siblings (Yes=1) 0.515 1.08 0.507 1.09 0.528 1.11 -0.166 -0.38 
Tiajing -2.911 -1.8 -0.578 -0.36 0.263 0.18 1.320 0.89 
Hebei -3.972 -3.27 -2.192 -1.88 -1.098 -1.04 -0.457 -0.4 
Shanxi -3.385 -2.73 -1.645 -1.41 0.0621 0.06 -0.486 -0.42 
Neimenggu -  -  -0.160 -0.06 -  
Liaoning -3.800 -3.19 -2.516 -2.22 -0.211 -0.2 0.776 0.69 
Jilin -3.960 -2.99 -2.630 -2.14 -0.394 -0.34 -0.617 -0.51 
Heilongjiang -4.022 -3.17 -2.088 -1.75 -0.217 -0.2 0.274 0.23 
Shanghai -2.609 -2.18 -1.619 -1.41 0.445 0.41 0.411 0.36 
Zhejiang -5.299 -3.93 -3.149 -2.44 -0.449 -0.38 0.683 0.55 
Jiangsu -5.594 -4.05 -1.824 -1.47 -1.525 -1.33 -0.646 -0.51 
Anhui -5.805 -4.04 -3.768 -2.93 -2.190 -1.95 -2.207 -1.79 
Fujian -3.576 -1.98 -4.908 -2.85 -4.681 -2.79 -3.346 -2.06 
Jinagxi -5.480 -4.16 -4.236 -3.4 -2.268 -1.98 -2.089 -1.72 
Shandong -3.771 -3.09 -3.117 -2.68 -1.190 -1.12 -0.935 -0.81 
Henan -2.872 -2.4 -2.475 -2.19 -0.751 -0.72 -0.909 -0.81 
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Table I.2. continue: OLS regression of years of schooling on circumstance variables by birth year cohort, for available provinces in China 
Explanatory Variables 55-59 t 60-64 t 65-69 t 70-74 t 
Hubei -3.463 -2.37 -1.331 -1.01 -0.662 -0.57 -0.326 -0.26 
Hunan -2.925 -2.22 -2.067 -1.71 0.843 0.76 -0.0793 -0.07 
Guangdong -4.506 -3.72 -3.269 -2.84 -1.943 -1.87 -0.913 -0.81 
Guangxi -2.689 -1.88 -2.736 -2.13 -0.531 -0.47 -0.299 -0.25 
Hainan -  -  -  -8.177 -2.83 
Chongqing -5.291 -3.21 -2.724 -1.93 -1.805 -1.26 -1.783 -1.31 
Sichuan -6.487 -5.12 -3.505 -3.02 -0.906 -0.84 -1.959 -1.69 
Guizhou -5.635 -4.15 -4.368 -3.35 -3.583 -3.17 -2.532 -2.12 
Yunnan -5.265 -3.95 -5.024 -4.12 -2.326 -2.14 -1.564 -1.34 
Xizang -  -  -  -  
Shan'xi -3.721 -2.72 -2.309 -1.87 -0.367 -0.32 0.213 0.18 
Gansu -5.957 -4.96 -3.460 -3.05 -2.528 -2.44 -2.208 -1.97 
Qinghai -  -  -  -  
Ningxia -    -  -  
Xinjiang -    -2.150 -0.55 -7.283 -2.52 
Constant 6.498 4.88 6,141 4.86 3.831 3.27 3.215 2.62 
Observations 1,835  2116  2,534  2,341  
R-squared 0.220  0.227  0.274  0.328  
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Table I.2. continue: OLS regression of years of schooling on circumstance variables by birth year cohort, for available provinces in China 
Explanatory Variables 75-79 t 80-84 t 85-89 t 90-94 t 
Hukou (Urban=1) 2.533 12.75 2.119 9.36 1.406 6.81 0.81 3.2 
Gender (Male=1) 0.976 5.36 0.332 1.66 -0.0289 -0.15 -0.0370 -0.16 
Parents party member (Yes=1) 0.734 2.85 1.285 4.43 1.012 3.23 0.108 0.28 
Ethnicity (Han=1) 1.269 3.55 1.312 3.4 0.645 1.61 1.835 3.73 
Father-primary school (Yes=1) 1.474 6.4 1.488 5.08 1.794 5.82 1.784 4.49 
Father-junior high (Yes=1) 2.478 9.04 1.982 6.59 2.775 9.31 2.260 6.02 
Father-senior high and over (Yes=1) 3.766 11.07 2.702 7.81 3.802 11.26 3.973 9.23 
One or two siblings (Yes=1) -0.536 -1.61 -1.076 -3.68 -1.173 -4.23 -1.342 -4.34 
Three or more siblings (Yes=1) -1.121 -3.07 -2.507 -6.82 -2.352 -6.19 -3.330 -6.48 
Tiajing 1.805 1.41 1.071 0.8 -0.675 -0.42 -1.655 -1.1 
Hebei -0.0127 -0.01 -1.424 -1.29 -2.147 -2.24 -2.405 -2.34 
Shanxi -0.806 -0.79 -0.534 -0.46 -1.616 -1.64 -3.506 -3.42 
Neimenggu -  -  -0.595 -0.17 1.844 0.75 
Liaoning 0.508 0.52 -1.612 -1.5 -1.752 -1.82 -2.446 -2.42 
Jilin -1.139 -1.04 -2.006 -1.65 -2.217 -1.93 -1.610 -1.24 
Heilongjiang -1.570 -1.54 -2.239 -1.92 -2.346 -2.11 -2.726 -2.35 
Shanghai 0.953 0.95 0.431 0.4 0.496 0.5 -2.668 -2.56 
Zhejiang 0.138 0.12 -0.656 -0.52 -1.671 -1.56 -2.454 -2.31 
Jiangsu 0.997 0.87 0.600 0.5 -0.476 -0.43 -1.857 -1.55 
Anhui -1.499 -1.32 -0.955 -0.7 -2.131 -1.69 -2.819 -2.4 
Fujian 0.437 0.33 -0.545 -0.4 -1.992 -1.5 -3.063 -1.9 
Jinagxi -0.730 -0.65 -2.696 -2.14 -1.325 -1.14 -3.028 -2.25 
Shandong 0.0275 0.03 -1.191 -1.05 -1.527 -1.5 -1.636 -1.54 
Henan 0.265 0.27 -1.112 -1.03 -2.047 -2.18 -3.290 -3.42 
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Table I.2. continue: OLS regression of years of schooling on circumstance variables by birth year cohort, for available provinces in China 
Explanatory Variables 75-79 t 80-84 t 85-89 t 90-94 t 
Hubei 0.484 0.43 -0.491 -0.37 -2.173 -1.68 -0.385 -0.29 
Hunan 1.013 0.96 0.630 0.52 -1.208 -1.07 -3.106 -2.6 
Guangdong -0.418 -0.43 -1.209 -1.11 -1.655 -1.72 -2.044 -2.13 
Guangxi -0.0417 -0.04 -2.563 -2.16 -2.734 -2.16 -4.678 -3.65 
Hainan -2.053 -0.56 -  -  -  
Chongqing -0.310 -0.19 -4.954 -2.61 -1.933 -1.32 -3.529 -1.42 
Sichuan -2.192 -2.15 -3.068 -2.63 -2.968 -2.98 -4.701 -4.47 
Guizhou -2.585 -2.38 -1.355 -1.09 -1.240 -1.11 -2.256 -1.8 
Yunnan -1.666 -1.64 -1.820 -1.54 -2.759 -2.67 -3.936 -3.52 
Xizang -  -  -  -3.331 -1.12 
Shan'xi -1.187 -1.13 -1.280 -0.99 -2.279 -2.09 -3.263 -2.84 
Gansu -2.224 -2.3 -2.422 -2.23 -2.765 -2.9 -2.737 -2.85 
Qinghai -  -  -3.084 -1.17 -  
Ningxia -  -  -  -2.333 -0.78 
Xinjiang -1.612 -0.71 -  -  0.382 0.17 
Constant 4.786 4.51 7.480 6.58 8.941 8.64 11.04 10.03 
Observations 1,591  1,316  1,365  1,233  
R-squared 0.399  0.381  0.316  0.280  
Notes: Robust t statistics available; variables with bold text have 5% statistical significance level or better. Due to violation of OLS assumptions 
in model test, the significance level may be overestimated.  
Resource: CFPS 2010-2016 and author’s calculation based on 𝑦 = 𝛽𝐶 + 𝜀   
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The coefficients are interpreted as additional years of schooling compared to the 
baseline group with exclude dummy circumstance variables, which is the only child of 
the family, lives in Beijing, and has an illiterate father. We can observe that urban hukou 
enjoys additional 2 years of schooling than rural hukou, comparing to 3.1 years in the 
summary data. The coefficient of urban hukou is positive and statistically significant in 
all year cohorts. Male also appears to enjoy additional 1.6 years of schooling in the 
overall sample, which consists with the preliminary data. The gender coefficient 
becomes less important after the 1980-84 cohort because of the one-child policy. 
Children whose parents are Communist party member tend to receive more years of 
schooling. Coefficients of Han ethnicity shows both signs, but only positive ones are 
statistically significant. Fathers with higher education increase the possibility of 
children receiving more years of schooling, proven by the all positive and statistically 
significant coefficients, with respectively additional 2, 3, and 3.8 years for primary 
school, junior high school and senior high school and above. Coefficients for having 1 
or 2 and 3 or more siblings appear in both signs, while the statistically significant ones 
after 1980-84 cohort and the overall sample illustrate that being the only child enjoys 
more years of schooling. Most geographic dummies show statistically significant and 
negative coefficients (except for Shanghai, Zhejiang and Jiangsu in several cohort, 
though statistically insignificant), which suggests children in Beijing receive the 
longest time of education.  
We can also infer certain aspect of the intergenerational mobility. Children whose father 
has higher education tend to have more education, though the coefficient differs in 
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different year cohort. For example, for fathers with senior high school and higher 
education, we can observe that the stickiness of intergenerational mobility is much 
higher in recent cohorts (the 1985-94 cohort) than the 1955-60 cohort. People born in 
the later cohort are influenced largely by the culture revolution (1966-76), and hence 
are less influenced by their fathers’ educational attainment.  
As mentioned in Methods section, we need to test the OLS model due to various reasons, 
including the omitted and unobserved circumstances, which could lead to biased 
coefficients and thus do not necessarily indicate causal relationship. Normality test 
(Figure I.A1 and A2 in appendix) indicates the residual is not normally distributed, thus 
the standard errors of OLS estimates is not perfectly reliable, which means the 
confidence intervals would be too narrow. However, normality is not required in order 
to obtain unbiased estimates of the regression coefficients. Multicollinearity test (Table 
I.A1 in appendix) proves most circumstance factors are not linearly related to each other, 
except for a few geographic dummy variables. As a rule of thumb, a variable whose 
VIF values are greater than 10 may be problematic. 4 provincial variables with VIF 
value a little bit over than 10 could imply similar educational resource endowment 
among provinces but should not affect the overall model. Model Specification test 
(Figure I.A3 in appendix) has failed to reject the hypothesis that the model is specified 
correctly. Therefore, it seems that we don’t have a specification error. Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity (in Appendix) shows a very small p 
value and we have to accept the alternative hypothesis that the variance is not 
homogenous. Cross-sectional studies are more likely to have heteroscedasticity because 
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they often have values differ in a big range. While heteroscedasticity does not cause 
bias in the coefficient estimates, it does make them less precise and further from the 
correct population value. Heteroscedasticity increases the variance of the coefficient 
estimates and tends to produce p-values that are smaller than the actual value, and in 
turn a statistically important coefficient could be not statistically important. Violation 
of the OLS assumptions will result in underestimated confidence intervals and 
underestimated p-value, and thus the statistical significance level of the independent 
variable may also be overestimated. Hence the statistical significance of the coefficients 
should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, the main goal of the article is to 
explore to what extent is the inequality in years of schooling attributable to 
circumstance variables, which will be shown in the next section.   
c. Inequality of opportunity  
First, I replicated Golley and Kong (2018)’s article on CFPS 2010&2012 data and get 
very similar results below. (Tables I.3 and Figure I.6. The regression results and partial 
contribution to relative inequality of opportunity can be found in Appendix.) We find 
both direct and indirect methods show close measurement of inequality in absolute and 
relative terms. The inequality of opportunity ranges from 26.5%(26.0%) in 1960-64 
cohort to 41.9%(42.4%) in 1980-84 cohort, in total inequality of years of schooling. 
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Table I.3: Inequality of opportunity in years of schooling by birth year cohort, for available provinces in China 
Birth cohort All 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 
Total outcome inequality                       
GE(2) 0.292 0.626 0.600 0.532 0.359 0.193 0.264 0.250 0.291 0.124 0.097 
Gini 0.426 0.596 0.583 0.561 0.470 0.342 0.402 0.393 0.426 0.275 0.242 
Direct                       
IOp (within group) 0.199 0.431 0.426 0.364 0.250 0.142 0.194 0.169 0.198 0.072 0.062 
Absolute: IOAD  (between 
group) 
0.093 0.195 0.170 0.168 0.109 0.051 0.070 0.080 0.093 0.052 0.034 
Relative: IORD 0.318 0.312 0.283 0.316 0.302 0.265 0.265 0.322 0.319 0.419 0.355 
Indirect                       
GE(2) y average 0.197 0.424 0.424 0.359 0.248 0.143 0.186 0.165 0.197 0.072 0.065 
IOAI 0.095 0.202 0.176 0.173 0.111 0.050 0.078 0.085 0.094 0.053 0.032 
IORI 0.327 0.323 0.293 0.325 0.309 0.260 0.297 0.341 0.325 0.424 0.331 
Source: CFPS 2010 & 2012 and author’s calculation based on regression results in Appendix and method described in section Methods. 
 
 
Figure I.6: Inequality of opportunity in years of schooling by birth year cohort from Golley and Kong’s paper (2018) 
Source: Golley and Kong (2018) 
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Second, I repeat the same method on with updated data (Table I.4 and Figure I.7). We 
can observe slightly smaller inequality measurements (both direct and indirect terms) 
from the updated 2010-2016 data than the 2010 baseline data. Similarly, both direct and 
indirect methods are very close in absolute and relative terms. The relative 
measurement ranges from 22.4%(22.0%) in 1955-59 cohort to 42.1%(38.1%) in 1980-
84 cohort. The measurements of total inequality, GE(2) and Gini9 index both have 
declining trends except the sudden drop in the 1960-64 cohort when most influenced 
by the infamous cultural revolution, which targeted to eliminate the “privileged” with 
high socioeconomic status and pursued Egalitarianism. The severe economic recession 
caused by the policy suggests that judging inequality outcomes only on total inequality 
or absolute term of inequality is unreliable and misleading.  
The relative term of inequality better reflects concepts of social justice. The inequality 
of opportunity is widening since the 1950-54 cohort and starts to mitigate from the 
1980-84 cohort. The increase of inequality of opportunity during the cultural revolution 
periods further proves the failure of the policy. On the other hand, the declining trend 
since 1980 suggests the 9-year compulsory education policy which enacts in 1982 plays 
an important role in improving social justice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
9 We use Gini index as comparison here. Gini index is a feasible measurement of total 
inequality, but it is not decomposable.  
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Table I.4: Inequality of opportunity in years of schooling by birth year cohort, for available provinces in China 
By birth cohort All 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 
Total outcome inequality                         
GE(2) 0.257 0.542 0.514 0.512 0.344 0.181 0.238 0.219 0.154 0.116 0.092 0.082 
Gini 0.395 0.558 0.544 0.545 0.455 0.325 0.376 0.361 0.301 0.261 0.230 0.223 
Direct                         
IOp (within group) 0.182 0.381 0.384 0.377 0.267 0.135 0.176 0.144 0.093 0.067 0.059 0.054 
Absolute: IOAD (between 
group) 0.075 0.162 0.130 0.135 0.077 0.047 0.063 0.074 0.061 0.049 0.034 0.028 
Relative: IORD 0.292 0.298 0.253 0.263 0.224 0.257 0.263 0.339 0.398 0.421 0.364 0.338 
Indirect                         
GE(2) y average 
GE(2)  
 
0.183 0.374 0.384 0.375 0.268 0.140 0.173 0.147 0.093 0.072 0.063 0.059 
IOAI 0.075 0.169 0.130 0.137 0.076 0.041 0.065 0.072 0.062 0.044 0.029 0.023 
IORI 0.291 0.311 0.252 0.268 0.220 0.227 0.274 0.328 0.399 0.381 0.316 0.279 
Source: CFPS 2010-2016 and author’s calculation based on regression results in Table 2 and method described in section Methods.
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Figure I.7(a): Outcome inequality and non-parametric inequality of opportunity 
(absolute and relative) by birth year cohort from Table 4  
Notes: GE(2) is half the coefficient of variation. IOAD and IORD are direct absolute 
and relative measures of inequality of opportunity in Table 4 
Source: CFPS 2010-2016 and author’s calculation  
 
 
Figure I.7(b): Outcome inequality and non-parametric inequality of opportunity 
(absolute and relative) by birth year cohort from Golley and Kong’s paper (2018) 
Source: Golley and Kong (2018) 
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Partial contribution to relative inequality of opportunity (IORp) is calculated to rank 
the importance of each circumstance factor (in Table I.5). For example, to calculate the 
partial contribution of gender, I assign every individual in the sample with the average 
value for the variable gender, re-run the regression to generate the predicted years of 
schooling and calculate the absolute and relative term of inequality of the new 
distribution. Lower relative inequality in the new distribution with the specific 
equalized circumstance variable indicates that variable accounts for more responsibility 
in causing inequality of opportunity. For example, in Row 6 Column 2 of Table I.5, 
removing gender variable will cause reduction in inequality of opportunity, from 29.2% 
in Table I.4 to 26.4%. 
The circumstance variables are ranked by their contribution to inequality of opportunity. 
Provinces, hukou, and father’s education remain in top 3 with few exceptions, while 
the influence of gender becomes less important. The rank of ethnicity stays low, 
indicating relatively equal opportunity among the Han majority and ethnic minorities, 
considering the minorities usually reside in less developed areas with lower 
socioeconomic status. It suggests the policies aiming the ethnic minorities are effective. 
The increasing rank of sibling size implies the effectiveness of one-child policy. The 
high rank of father’s education displays the existence of intergenerational transition of 
educational attainment. The two biggest contributors, hukou and province, agree on 
Golley and Kong’s conclusion that where you live do matter. The hukou system worth 
special attention because it is unique in China and has huge influence.
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Table I.5: Ranking of circumstance variables’ partial contribution to relative inequality of opportunity by birth year cohort, for available provinces 
in China  
Partial contribution all iorp 40-44 iorp 45-49 iorp 50-54 iorp 55-59 iorp 60-64 iorp 65-69 iorp 
Urban hukou  2 0.202 4 0.242 2 0.168 2 0.187 3 0.178 1 0.154 3 0.183 
Father's education 1 0.146 3 0.239 3 0.197 4 0.212 4 0.192 3 0.166 2 0.176 
Province 3 0.228 1 0.198 1 0.159 1 0.185 2 0.138 2 0.161 1 0.176 
Parents party member 6 0.274 5 0.307 5 0.249 5 0.254 5 0.209 5 0.211 5 0.253 
Male 5 0.264 2 0.227 4 0.202 3 0.199 1 0.138 4 0.174 4 0.250 
Number of siblings 4 0.256 6 0.313 6 0.251 6 0.267 6 0.218 7 0.223 6 0.259 
Han 7 0.286 7 0.318 7 0.258 7 0.268 7 0.219 6 0.220 7 0.271 
70-74 iorp 75-79 iorp 80-84 iorp 85-89 iorp 90-94 iorp 
2 0.212 1 0.237 1 0.232 3 0.234 2 0.190 
1 0.210 2 0.243 3 0.265 1 0.154 1 0.145 
3 0.219 3 0.248 2 0.255 2 0.225 3 0.196 
4 0.303 7 0.384 5 0.346 5 0.297 6 0.278 
5 0.303 6 0.382 7 0.378 7 0.317 7 0.280 
6 0.307 4 0.369 4 0.285 4 0.240 5 0.245 
7 0.312 5 0.371 6 0.348 6 0.304 4 0.228 
Note: Circumstance variables are ranked by their contribution to inequality of opportunity. Partial contribution to relative inequality of opportunity 
(IORp) is calculated by assigning variable mean to the group. 
Source: CFPS 2010-2016 and author’s calculation based on regression results above and method described in section Methods.
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Interestingly, the educational inequality of opportunity in China reflects the rapid social 
and political changes in China since 1940s. When People’s Republic of China was 
established in 1945, the goal of the phase was to reduce illiteracy, and universal 
education popularized rapidly. In the First Five Year Plan (1953~1957), educational 
resources were devoted to train skilled workers. During 1945~1957, the inequality of 
opportunity was high with a low overall education level. Great Leap Forward in 1958 
shifted education agenda with political agenda to “left”, and enrollment into primary 
level of education grew rapidly while curriculums showed more political tendency. 
During the decade of Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) policies shifted to extreme left 
and universities were closed. Mass education was promoted while elitism was disdained. 
During this period, the economy experienced a recession and educational inequality of 
opportunity showed unexpected increase. National entry test to universities (Gaokao) 
was not resumed until 1977. Along with reform and opening policy starting from 1978, 
education goal shifted to high quality education. The Compulsory Education Law in 
1986 helped students in rural area to adopt primary and junior high school level of 
education.  Since then, the overall educational level experiences constant increase 
while the inequality keeps narrowing down. The One-Child policy announced in early 
1980s reduce the importance of gender’s role playing in educational attainment. The 
college enrollment expansion in 1999 focused in urban area largely increase the 
population portion with higher than senior high school education. Emran and Sun (2011) 
claim such policy coincides with the fiscal decentralization which shift the financial 
burden on lower-level of government agencies and in turn intensify the urban-rural and 
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provincial inequalities. 
d. Alternative groups 
Insufficient number of observations under each subgroup is a general problem 
researchers encounter using Roemer’s type when measuring inequality. In this study we 
use 6 circumstance variables forming 192 types, which leaves more than 2/5 of groups 
with less than 1 observation. Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) claim that too few 
observations significantly impair the precision of the estimation.  
Therefore, I choose the most important contributors (in Table I.5): hukou and father’s 
education forming 8 types with sufficient observations in each group. The total 
inequality and parametric measurement of inequality are unaffected, while the non-
parametric estimation of inequality decreases in value (comparing Table I.6 to Table I.4) 
but remains the same trend.  
In reality, population can be divided according to many other circumstances. Ferreira 
and Gignoux (2011) claim omitting those circumstances and restricting the number of 
types because of limited data entry potentially leads to underestimation of inequality, 
and our result proves their point. Hence, the parametric method which overcomes above 
problems is useful in terms of reference, and we believe the reasonable range of 
inequality of opportunity is from 25% to 40%.  
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Table I.6: Inequality of opportunity in years of schooling with alternative group division by birth year cohort, for available provinces in China 
By birth cohort All 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 
Total outcome inequality                       
GE(2) 0.257 0.542 0.514 0.512 0.344 0.181 0.238 0.219 0.154 0.116 0.092 0.082 
Gini 0.395 0.558 0.544 0.545 0.455 0.325 0.376 0.361 0.301 0.261 0.230 0.223 
Direct (alternative groups)                       
IOp (within group) 0.201 0.459 0.443 0.444 0.320 0.158 0.194 0.168 0.109 0.084 0.070 0.067 
Absolute: IOAD (between 
group) 0.057 0.084 0.071 0.068 0.024 0.023 0.044 0.050 0.046 0.032 0.022 0.015 
Relative: IORD 0.220 0.155 0.137 0.133 0.071 0.128 0.186 0.230 0.296 0.274 0.239 0.185 
Indirect             
GE(2) y average 0.183 0.374 0.384 0.375 0.268 0.140 0.173 0.147 0.093 0.072 0.063 0.059 
IOAI 0.075 0.169 0.130 0.137 0.076 0.041 0.065 0.072 0.062 0.044 0.029 0.023 
IORI 0.291 0.311 0.252 0.268 0.220 0.227 0.274 0.328 0.399 0.381 0.316 0.279 
Source: CFPS 2010 - 2016 and author’s calculation based on regression results in Table 2 and method described in section Methods. 
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Conclusion and discussion 
In this article we find that as the average years of schooling increased steadily, the 
lower-bound inequality of opportunity constitutes 29% of the educational outcome 
inequality from CFPS data on population born from 1940 to 1994. The inequality of 
opportunity was increasing from the 1960s, passing through the Cultural Revolution, 
the reform and opening policy, one child policy, and the trend is declining since 1985. 
The most influential circumstances include hukou, father’s education and province of 
residence. Urban hukou enjoy 3 more years of education controlling for other factors, 
and this result may result in rethinking the rationality of the hukou system.   
The reasons for educational resource inequality are complex and comprise both unequal 
allocation of natural resources and human capital. In less developed areas, geographic 
limitations restrict access to resources. For example, in some extreme underdeveloped 
areas, students need to climb an 800-meter cliff in order to get to school10. The Chinese 
government has spent billions on improving the infrastructures and very few children 
need to face the cliff-climbing situations nowadays. In many rural villages, school 
building are the most safe and modern architectures, and classrooms have little visible 
differences with those in urban areas. However, rural students are still disadvantaged if 
we take teachers into consideration. Because of salary, transportation, and living 
conditions, most of the high-quality teachers stay in urban area. One attempt to mitigate 
this inequality is live-streaming teaching11, that experienced teachers in famous schools 
                                                   
10 Lu, S. (2016, May 27). China: Students make terrifying school run. CNN NEWS WORLD 
Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2016/05/27/europe/china-children-education-
climb/index.html 
11 FENG, J (2018, December 13).  Live-Streaming Offers Possible Solution to Education 
Inequality in China. Home Society & Culture Society.  
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live teach while in less developed areas, local teachers assist students to learn. Though 
the results of live teaching in China are as yet unproven, the approach offers a partial 
solution to teacher shortages in less developed areas. In addition, students from rural 
areas who succeed in their higher education probably choose to stay in urban areas and 
leave the rural area still deficient in human capital, forming a vicious cycle. Urban-rural 
education inequality is embedded in China along with the left-behind children problem. 
Parents coming from poor areas cannot support their family at their hometowns, and 
they migrate as temporary workers between their hometowns and large cities. Though 
parents’ presence is proven to be critical to children’s development (Thompson, 2014), 
China’s hukou policy restricts them from obtaining urban hukou (legal residential rights) 
and hampers rural children from entering urban schools and living with their parents 
who work in urban areas. Children are usually left behind in the hometown with lower 
quality education, taken care of by grandparents, who are usually less educated. Left-
behind children tend to leave school early because their parents can’t give them support 
in mental, economic and social relationship skills. Lack of study motivation and clear 
career plans cause left-behind children more frequently leave school early and work to 
support their family. Su’s study (2015) based on CHNS database finds that male 
students are more likely to drop out of school than female students because the market 
gives higher expected salary to male workers. 
Many people did believe in the slogan for the compulsory education policy: “Education 
                                                   
Retrieved from https://supchina.com/2018/12/13/live-streaming-offers-possible-solution-
to-education-inequality-in-china/ 
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Changes the Destiny”, because in the past half century, the social mobility in China was 
tremendous and many people achieved upward mobility taking the advantages of 
college enrollment expansion and substantial economic growth (Golley and Kong, 
2013). However, more people are now questioning about the usefulness of education 
because of the emerging class solidification. Zhou and Xu’s study (2017) report rural-
urban children suffer lower marginal positive effect on their schooling outcomes result 
from their parents’ educational attainment than urban children. Students in 
economically disadvantageous family will actively give up further education if they do 
not expect enough future return from education. Because of the college enrollment 
expansion, the college diploma is not as attractive as 10 years ago. And nowadays 
whether a person can get a job not only depends on the diploma, but also the family 
resources. Kanbur and Stiglitz (1986) discuss the transition matrices that lead to 
different level of dynastic inequality.   
The results of the article can point directions for inequality-mitigating policies. For 
example, “National New-Type Urbanisation Plan, 2014–2020” which aims to help left-
behind children (those who are left in rural areas while their parents work in urban areas) 
to enter the urban school system and reunite with their parents could potentially reduce 
the urban-rural gap, under both direct (better educational resources) and indirect 
(accompany with parents) influences. The reduction in inequality of opportunity 
provides evidence in support of the effectiveness of some policies to a certain degree, 
and we should consider educational inequality an intergenerational problem, and 
integrated with labor migration, human capital investment, industrial restructuring 
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when making policies.   
One of the limitations of using the low-bound estimation is that we underestimate the 
inequality of opportunity because of the unobserved, omitted, and corelated 
circumstances/effort. The improvement on accuracy could be realized with increasing 
amount of future survey data. However, it is unrealistic to include more than 10 
circumstance variables because with the sufficient observations under each type, the 
survey sample is going to be very large, and very difficult to collect.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure I.A1: kernel density estimate on residual vs. normal density  
Source: CFPS2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 
 
Figure I.A2: Normality test for residual 
Source: CFPS2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 
We can reject the hypothesis that res is normally distributed. 
 
Table I.A1: Multicollinearity test for OLS regression of years of schooling on 
circumstances 
Variable VIF 1/VIF    
Gansu 15.98 0.062567 
Henan 15.27 0.065497 
Liaoning 13.3 0.075163 
Guangdong 10.52 0.095016 
Shanghai 9.62 0.103982 
Hebei 9.02 0.110842 
Shandong 8.13 0.122974 
Sichuan 7.27 0.137558 
Shanxi  6.93 0.144381 
         res       17,250     0.0000        0.0000           .         0.0000
                                                                             
    Variable          Obs  Pr(Skewness)  Pr(Kurtosis) adj chi2(2)   Prob>chi2
                                                                 joint       
                    Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality
. sktest res
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Heilongjiang 5.38 0.18578 
Yunnan 5.25 0.190454 
Guizhou 4.95 0.202023 
Hunan 4.74 0.210955 
Shanxi 4.12 0.24253 
Three or more siblings (Yes=1) 4.01 0.24953 
One or two siblings (Yes=1) 3.87 0.258606 
Jilin 3.76 0.266191 
Shan'xi 3.75 0.266325 
Jiangsu 3.71 0.269663 
Guangxi 3.66 0.273535 
Anhui 3.44 0.290979 
Zhejiang 3.37 0.296705 
Hubei 3.05 0.327634 
Chongqing 2.27 0.440255 
Tianjin 1.97 0.508052 
Fujian 1.91 0.522651 
Ethnicity (Han=1) 1.34 0.747347 
Father-junior high (Yes=1) 1.2 0.835629 
Hukou (Urban=1) 1.19 0.842865 
Father-primary school (Yes=1) 1.18 0.848248 
Father-senior high and over (Yes=1) 1.17 0.851901 
Xinjiang 1.05 0.954051 
Parents party member (Yes=1) 1.04 0.959141 
Hainan 1.03 0.96892 
Neimenggu 1.03 0.968963 
Qinghai 1.02 0.98322 
Gender (Male=1) 1.01 0.993202    
Mean VIF 4.64 
 
Source: CFPS2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 
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Figure I.A3: Model specification test for OLS regression of years of schooling on 
circumstances. 
Source: CFPS2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 
Linktest is based on the idea that if a regression is properly specified, one should not be 
able to find any additional independent variables that are significant except by chance. 
Linktest creates two new variables, the variable of prediction, _hat, and the variable of 
squared prediction, _hatsq. The model is then refit using these two variables as 
predictors. _hat should be significant since it is the predicted value. On the other hand, 
_hatsq shouldn’t, because if our model is specified correctly, the squared predictions 
should not have much explanatory power. The ovtest performs a regression 
specification error test (RESET) for omitted variables. It creates new variables based 
on the predictors and refits the model using those new variables to see if any of them 
would be significant. Both tests tell us that we do not have a specification error. 
                  Prob > F =      0.5102
               F(3, 17209) =      0.77
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of yearofsch
. ovtest
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1517548   .1842829    -0.82   0.410     -.512968    .2094583
      _hatsq    -.0036177   .0038911    -0.93   0.353    -.0112447    .0040092
        _hat     1.050518   .0556224    18.89   0.000     .9414923    1.159543
                                                                              
   yearofsch        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    399217.386    17,249  23.1443786   Root MSE        =    4.0522
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.2905
    Residual    283207.369    17,247  16.4206743   R-squared       =    0.2906
       Model    116010.017         2  58005.0083   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(2, 17247)     =   3532.44
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =    17,250
. linktest
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Figure I.A4. Homoscedasticity test for OLS regression of years of schooling on 
circumstances. 
Source: CFPS2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 
Large Chi square indicates heteroskedasticity in Breusch-Pagan test.  
 
 
Figure I.A5: Determinants of years of schooling. 
Source: CFPS2010&2012 
 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =    21.71
         Variables: fitted values of yearofsch
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. estat hettest
Determinants of years of schooling 
VARIABLES all 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89
Hukou (Urban=1) 3.262***3.968***3.793***3.959***4.221*** 3.107***3.652***3.338***3.262***3.016***1.767***
Gender (Male=1) 1.492***2.837***1.989***2.446***2.490*** 1.740***1.410***1.481***1.492***0.136 0.204
Parents party member (Yes=1) 0.0128 0.0267 -0.0722 0.434** -0.0379 -0.179 -0.294 0.180 0.0128 0.262 -0.225
Ethnicity (Han=1) 0.375***0.220 -0.545 0.0269 0.233 0.720** 0.344 1.167***0.375***1.289***0.605*
Father-primary school (Yes=1) 2.184***2.167***1.755***1.627***1.246*** 1.195***1.647***1.511***2.184***1.820***2.285***
Father-junior high (Yes=1) 3.244***1.291* 1.533***0.472 0.932*** 1.242***1.953***2.475***3.244***2.537***3.095***
Father-senior high and over (Yes=1)3.878***0.591 1.416***1.206*** 0.661 2.069***2.582***3.330***3.878***3.317***3.962***
One or two siblings (Yes=1) 0.0415 0.618 0.172 -0.117 1.128*** 0.632 0.219 0.922** 0.0415 -0.426 -0.824***
Three or more siblings (Yes=1) -1.016***0.744* 0.475 -0.152 1.099*** 0.548 -0.0868 0.203 -1.016***-2.134***-1.959***
Tiajing -0.370 -9.613***-2.282 -3.537***0.890 -1.025 -2.099 0.309 -0.370 -0.403 -0.474
Hebei -0.974**-3.803* -2.370 -0.326 -0.122 -1.919* -1.848 -1.959* -0.974**-1.579 -1.854
Shanxi -1.223***-3.965**-2.407 -1.149 0.258 -2.449**-1.429 -2.838**-1.223***-1.683 -1.740
Neimenggu -1.497 - -0.142 - -0.564 -3.185 -0.616 - -1.497 - 0.685
Liaoning -0.708* -1.979 -1.650 -0.265 -0.233 -2.383**-1.067 -0.959 -0.708* -1.927* -1.879
Jilin -1.206***-2.590 -2.149 -1.112 0.0365 -2.811***-1.724 -2.697**-1.206***-1.720 -2.479
Heilongjiang -1.468***-4.423**-3.107**-1.147 -0.660 -2.311**-1.903 -2.219* -1.468***-2.373**-1.763
Shanghai -0.133 -2.918 -1.474 -0.271 1.386 -1.054 -0.267 -0.712 -0.133 0.172 0.474
Zhejiang -1.408***-4.169**-3.940**-1.658* -0.821 -2.587**-1.025 -1.001 -1.408***-0.459 -1.065
Jiangsu -0.551 -3.964* -2.133 -1.337 -0.948 -1.914* -2.144* -2.814**-0.551 1.689 0.342
Anhui -2.381***-5.961***-3.977**-3.593***-0.791 -2.902**-2.632**-3.427***-2.381***-1.196 -2.241
Fujian -2.891***-7.918***-4.900***-1.448 -2.475* -5.459***-4.499***-4.785***-2.891***-3.022**-2.696
Jinagxi -2.357***-4.590**-3.073* -2.185**-1.313 -4.193***-2.764**-4.443***-2.357***-3.444***-2.191
Shandong -1.391***-3.245 -2.671* -1.708** 0.354 -2.845***-1.966 -2.750**-1.391***-1.423 -1.700
Henan -1.177***-3.605* -2.566* -0.758 0.868 -2.434**-1.651 -2.906**-1.177***-1.804* -2.159
Hubei -0.863**-4.774**-3.648**-1.494 0.454 -2.069* -1.291 -1.022 -0.863**-0.879 -1.999
Hunan -0.171 -2.283 -1.907 0.182 0.668 -2.054* 0.0671 -0.933 -0.171 0.771 -0.620
Guangdong -1.367***-4.671**-2.832* -0.885 -0.462 -3.142***-3.088**-2.471**-1.367***-0.538 -0.244
Guangxi -1.299***-3.979* -4.311**-0.820 0.683 -2.567**-1.882 -2.356* -1.299***-2.822**-2.019
Hainan -1.001 - - - - - 2.959 -9.856**-1.001 - -
Chongqing -2.086***-4.319**-3.199* -1.731 -1.024 -2.357* -1.998 -3.516***-2.086***-3.640**-1.619
Sichuan -2.409***-5.066**-3.711**-2.368***-2.231**-3.738***-1.791 -3.542***-2.409***-3.007***-2.566*
Guizhou -3.145***-5.567***-4.836***-3.292***-1.974* -4.263***-4.389***-4.263***-3.145***-1.554 -1.046
Yunnan -2.211***-6.241***-4.058**-1.852* -1.107 -4.275***-3.607***-3.382***-2.211***-2.258**-2.916*
Xizang - - - - - - - - - - -
Shan'xi -0.926**-2.784 -1.864 -1.093 0.133 -2.529**-1.783 -2.451**-0.926**-1.394 -1.155
Gansu -2.840***-5.590***-3.960***-2.205***-1.891* -3.559***-3.578***-4.667***-2.840***-3.446***-2.884**
Qinghai - - - - - - - - - - -
Ningxia -1.189 - - - - -0.268 - - -1.189 - -
Xinjiang -5.605 - - - -5.255 - - - -5.605 - -
Constant 5.307***4.798** 4.868***3.128*** 1.965* 6.199***5.711***5.293***5.307***7.575***8.534***
Observations 19,103 1,052 1,663 2,264 2,106 2,344 2,699 2,459 19,103 1,414 1,407
R-squared 0.325 0.320 0.281 0.325 0.309 0.260 0.297 0.341 0.325 0.424 0.331
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Figure I.A6: Partial contribution to relative inequality of opportunity.  
Source: CFPS 2010&2012 and author’s calculation based on regression results above 
and method described in section Methods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Partical contribution to ralative ineqaulity of opportunity
all iorp 40-44 iorp 45-49 iorp 50-54 iorp 55-59 iorp 60-64 iorp 65-69 iorp 70-74 iorp 75-79 iorp 80-84 iorp 85-89 iorp
Urban hukou at 12 2 0.202 2 0.220 1 0.142 1 0.1594 1 0.151 1 0.135 1 0.171 3 0.220 2 0.204 1 0.254 3 0.244
Father's education 1 0.161 4 0.259 3 0.222 4 0.275 4 0.278 3 0.201 3 0.192 2 0.213 1 0.161 3 0.269 1 0.158
Province 3 0.250 1 0.211 2 0.190 2 0.235 2 0.222 2 0.178 2 0.189 1 0.205 3 0.252 2 0.268 2 0.208
Parents party member 7 0.322 7 0.319 6 0.277 6 0.325 7 0.309 7 0.259 7 0.296 7 0.341 7 0.325 7 0.424 7 0.330
Male 5 0.301 3 0.246 4 0.225 3 0.248 3 0.241 4 0.214 4 0.272 4 0.315 5 0.301 6 0.423 6 0.329
Number of siblings 4 0.288 5 0.315 5 0.273 7 0.325 6 0.308 6 0.259 5 0.288 5 0.318 4 0.287 4 0.331 4 0.264
Han 6 0.318 6 0.319 7 0.280 5 0.324 5 0.307 5 0.253 6 0.294 6 0.326 6 0.321 5 0.389 5 0.318
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CONCENTRATION CURVE-BASED ANALYSIS OF CHILDHOOD STUNTING 
INEQUALITY IN CHINA 
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Introduction 
Despite the rapid economic growth in China, inequality in China remains high. The 
GDP growth rate has remained above 7% annually for the last 3 decades, and income 
per capital has risen from $990 (1990) to $16,760 (2017)12. On the other hand, income 
inequality has widened, especially between the urban, eastern coastal provinces and 
rural inland areas due to unbalanced economic development and different access to 
resources. The World Bank indicates that poverty in China now mainly refers to the 
rural poor because urban poverty has been largely eliminated due to the economic 
growth (Appleton et al., 2010). Inequality in education and health are correlated with 
income inequality, because the poorer population has less access to educational and 
health resources. The inequality in education and health in turn affects people’s human 
capital and ability to work, and further reinforces the income inequality. Gao et al. 
(2001), Liu et al. (2002), Zhang and Kanbur (2005) discussed unequal distribution of 
health service access in China, especially the rural-urban division. Gustafsson and Li 
(2004), Banister and Zhang (2005) claim the rural poor are “health-stricken” rather than 
poverty stricken. The Rural Cooperative Medical System (RCMS) has a low annual 
cost (usually less than $100) but only covers 50% of the treatment fee for regular 
diseases in 1 year. Populations who suffer from severe or chronic diseases and who 
could not afford a better medial plan only get limited help from the RCMS. The extreme 
poor can not afford any medical plan at all. So many poor people are constrained by 
illness and kept trapped in poverty. Hence, due to its human welfare and economic 
                                                   
12 The World Bank, China Overview. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview 
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development effects, health inequality in China is a timely and important topic to 
investigate. 
Data from the World Health Organization (WHO) show that in 2010, 115 million 
children were underweight, 55 million children were affected by acute malnutrition, 
171 million children under 5 were stunted. From 1990 to 2010, the prevalence of 
underweight children under 5 in developing countries has fallen from 29% to 18%, but 
18% is not sufficient for reaching the goal of reducing underweight children by half 
(14%) from 1990 to 2015 specified in Millennium Development Goals 1.C 13 . 
Children’s nutritional condition is affected by many environmental factors, many 
mutually reinforcing, including residence in urban/rural region (hukou in China, Liu et 
al. 2015; Tian, 2017), family socioeconomic conditions (parents’ income, occupation, 
etc. Wu et al. 2015; Cedraz and Carvalho 1990), sex, age (Zhang et al. 2016) and 
geographic region of residence (Fu and George, 2015). Smoking and passive smoke 
also have negative influence on pregnant women and infants. The rate of smokers is 
higher among low income families. Black et al (2008) estimate childhood malnutrition 
is the direct reason for 35% of children motility under 5. Each year, over 2 million 
children under 5 die because of malnutrition globally. Many researchers (Jamison 1986; 
Zhang et al. 2017; Huang et al. 2013) have found that malnutrition has a negative 
influence on cognitive development, educational attainment and labor productivity. 
Childhood malnutrition has a strong association with non-commutable diseases like 
                                                   
13 MDG 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. (2015, December 07). Retrieved from 
https://www.who.int/topics/millennium_development_goals/hunger/en/ 
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hypertension and diabetes in later life. Developmental retardation, iodine deficiency, 
iron deficiency, and lack of cognitive stimulation become main risk factors for 200 
million children who could not exert full potential. Haddad et al (1989) find wage 
evidence from Philippines that every 1 centimeter increased in height increases 4% of 
farmer income. Li et al (1999) analyze rural minority children in Yunnan province and 
claim child malnutrition is caused by long term socioeconomic underdevelopment 
rather than immediate lack of food. 
Analysis of health inequality can reveal how socioeconomic conditions including 
household income, rural-urban disparity, parents’ education, gender and geographic 
differences affect child malnutrition. According to WHO, measurements of child 
malnutrition include height-for-age (stunting), weight-for-age (underweight), and 
weight-for-height (wasting). Most studies focus on wasting and stunting because 
underweight is less clearly interpreted. In his study, I will focus on stunting because 
weight can be affected by short term lack of food while stunting score better reflects 
long-term nutritional conditions. The choice of stunting is also consistent with initial 
work on health sector inequality with a concentration curve, a modified Lorenz curve 
to measure health sector inequality. This work by Wagstaff et al (2003) choose stunting 
as the malnutrition indicator in Vietnam, exploring variables affecting stunting, and 
decomposing the stunting inequality to show how changes in variable means, variable 
distribution, and variable’s influence on stunting can change the inequality. Chen et al 
(2007) followed Wagstaff’s approach and applying Chinese data through 2000.  
The principal objectives of this paper are 1) to measure stunting inequality applying 
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Wagstaff’s approach for more recent data than previous, 2) to investigate the 
environmental factors that cause child stunting inequality in China, 3) to decompose 
stunting inequality to find the influential variables, and 4) to discuss policy implications.  
This article uses Wagstaff et al (2003)’s method and updates the analysis of 1989-2000 
data in Chen et al. (2007) from 2000-2011.   
Literature  
Wagstaff et al. (1989) first introduced the concept of concentration curve, a 
modification of Gini Coefficient, to measure health inequalities associated with 
socioeconomic status (SES). This income-related health inequality indicator was 
designed to measure which health policy instruments better targets low-income 
population. Wagstaff, van Doorslaer, and Watanabe (2003) further improved the method. 
They analyzed 1993 and 1998 Vietnamese children’s stunting scores (i.e., height-for-
age z-scores, HAZ) ranked by per capital household consumption. They found that 
stunting inequality in both years was largely attributable to inequality of household 
expenditure and commune level transportation. For each individual in the sample, they 
decomposed the causes of stunting inequality using linear regression and also 
decomposed the changes over time by differentiating the resulting regression equation. 
The noted that the inequality change over time can be caused by changes in determinant 
variable mean, changes in the importance of the determinant variable to total inequality, 
and the change in its effects on other variables. They claim that there could be a 
potential tradeoff between improvement of total inequality and the mean of variable of 
interest, HAZ scores. Increasing income reduces mean stunting level but increasing 
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inequality in income worsens inequality in health indicator. This same tradeoff is also 
discussed by Contoyannis and Forster (1999). The tradeoff between decrease of mean 
stunting level and increase of stunting inequality is worth paying attention to when 
developing and implementing policies.  
Sahn’s review (2012) indicates that compared to the absolute level of health, health 
inequality measurement is multidimensional. He also emphasizes the tradeoff between 
improving the outcome and the equality of outcome, and he suggests policy makers 
should take both social justice and economic efficiency into consideration.   
Chen, Eastwood and Yen (2007) analyzed data from the China Health and Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS) for 9 provinces using data from 1989-2000 and chose negative values 
of the HAZ score as their measurement of malnutrition. Their study concludes that 
household per capital income, household head’s education, hukou in an urban area, and 
access to bus stop from residence relate to lower level of stunting, while gender and age 
are not associated with stunting level. They also find unequal distribution of geographic 
gap and household head’s education worsen the inequality in stunting level. This paper 
builds on their work and investigates what happens to child stunting inequality after 
2000 up to 2011. 
 
Methods 
A health inequality concentration curve (Figure II.1) is similar to Lorenz curve, expect 
than it graphs the cumulative percentage of health indicator on the y-axis and the y 
value is ranked by income on the x-axis from the lowest to the highest. Consider a 
65 
 
coordinate axis with cumulative percentage of health received on y-axis and cumulative 
percent of people ranked by income from the least advantages to the most advantaged 
on x-axis. 
 
Figure II.1: Concentration curve 
If everyone achieves equal health outcomes regardless of their SES, the plot would be 
a 45-degree line on the coordinate axis. If the curve lies below the 45-degree line, 
people who are less advantaged in SES suffer more from inequality and vice versa. The 
further the curve deviates away from the 45-degree line, more unequal the sample is. 
The Concentration Index, written as C, is twice the area between the concentration 
curve and diagonal. C can be written in many ways, one of them being: 
C = 
2
𝑛?̅?
∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑅𝑖 − 1                                            (1) 
where y denotes the health measurement, n denotes the sample size, ?̅? denotes the 
sample mean of y, 𝑦𝑖 denotes the y for the i
th person in the income distribution, and 
𝑅𝑖 denotes the fractional rank for the i
th person. C is the relative measurement of 
inequality and scaling every individual’s health measurement will not change the value 
of C. C takes the value of 0 if the concentration curve coincides with the diagonal and  
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the sample is completely equal. When the variable is a negative outcome such as 
stunting measured as HAZ, a disadvantage to the poor implies a concentration curve 
above the diagonal and negative value of C. 
A linear regression model links k determinant 𝑥𝑘 to the variable of interest, y: 
yi = 𝛼 ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘                                             (2) 
where 𝛼 denotes the constant, 𝛽 denotes the coefficient for the determinant, and 𝜀 
denotes the error term. In our study, y denotes stunting, and 𝑥𝑘 include but not limited 
to: sex, age, residence, socioeconomic status (family income, expenditure, parents’ 
occupation, education, etc.), mother’s age at birth, and etc. By applying the linear model, 
we assume everyone in the sample faces the same coefficient matrix. Combining 
equation (1) and (2), the concentration index can be written as14: 
C = ∑ (𝛽𝑘?̅?𝑘𝑘 /?̅?)/𝐶𝑘 𝐺𝜀/?̅?                                       (3)  
where ?̅?𝑘  is the mean of 𝑥𝑘 , 𝐶𝑘  is the CI for 𝑥𝑘 , and 𝐺𝜀  is a generalized 
concentration index for 𝜀𝑖, an analogue to the Gini coefficient, defined as:  
𝐺𝜀 =
2
𝑛
∑ 𝜀𝑖𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1                                                  (4) 
Thus, C can be decomposed to 2 parts: the first part is the weighted sum of the 
concentration indices of the k determinants 𝑥𝑘, weighted by share for the determinate 
variable, which is the elasticity of y to the mean of 𝑥𝑘. The second part is the random 
disturbance term, which defines the factors that influence health inequality but are not 
captured in the model.  
Wagstaff et al. (2003) provides 3 decompositions for change of concentration indices 
                                                   
14 Calculation is proved in Wagstaff, et. al. (2003) “On decomposing the causes of health sector inequalities 
with an application to malnutrition inequalities in Vietnam”, Appendix A1 
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over different time period, as: 
∆𝐶 = ∑ (𝛽𝑘𝑡𝑘 ?̅?𝑘𝑡/?̅?𝑡)𝐶𝑘𝑡 − ∑ (𝛽𝑘(𝑡−1)𝑘 ?̅?𝑘(𝑡−1)/?̅?(𝑡−1))𝐶𝑘(𝑡−1) + ∆(𝐺𝜀𝑡/?̅?𝑡)      (5)   
∆𝐶 = ∑ 𝜂𝑘(𝐶𝑘𝑡𝑘 − 𝐶𝑘(𝑡−1)) + ∑ 𝐶𝑘(𝑡−1)𝑘 (𝜂𝑘𝑡 − 𝜂𝑘(𝑡−1)) + ∆(𝐺𝜀𝑡/?̅?𝑡)           (6) 
∆𝐶 = ∑ 𝜂𝑘(𝑡−1)(𝐶𝑘𝑡𝑘 − 𝐶𝑘(𝑡−1)) + ∑ 𝐶𝑘𝑡𝑘 (𝜂𝑘𝑡 − 𝜂𝑘(𝑡−1)) + ∆(𝐺𝜀𝑡/?̅?𝑡)          (7) 
Taking the difference of equation (3) gives equation (5), but this decomposition 
approach does not tell reader what causes the changes in inequality, whether it’s from 
changes of determinant’s mean or changes in its influence on other variables. And 
empirically, these changes can offset each other. The Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition is 
a statistical method can decompose the change in means of dependent variable into 
changes in means of independent variables and change in effect of independent 
variables (Oaxaca, 1973). Applying a Oaxaca-type decomposition to equation (3) gives 
equation (6) and (7). These decomposition approaches reveal whether the changes in 
inequality come from changes in inequality of the determinant variables (∆C ) or 
changes in their elasticities(∆𝜂𝑘) .  
However, equation (5) ~ (7) are not enough to tell the differences among change of C 
due to components of 𝜂𝑘𝑡. For empirical analysis, it is necessary to know whether the 
change from 𝜂𝑘 comes from 𝛽𝑘 or ?̅?𝑘. Taking total differential of equation (3) gives 
equation (8)15, showing changes in α,  𝛽𝑘, ?̅?𝑘, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑘 accordingly: 
dC =  
𝑑𝐶
𝑑𝛼
𝑑𝛼 + ∑
𝑑𝐶
𝑑𝛽𝑘
𝑘
𝑑𝛽𝑘 + ∑
𝑑𝐶
𝑑?̅?𝑘
𝑑?̅?𝑘 + ∑
𝑑𝐶
𝑑𝐶𝑘
𝑑𝐶𝑘 + 𝑑
𝐺𝐶𝜀
𝜇
𝑘𝑘
 
   = −
𝐶
𝜇
𝑑𝛼 + ∑
?̅?𝑘
𝜇𝑘
(𝐶𝑘 − 𝐶)𝑑𝛽𝑘 + ∑
𝛽𝑘
𝜇𝑘
(𝐶𝑘 − 𝐶)𝑑?̅?𝑘 + ∑
𝛽𝑘?̅?𝑘
𝜇𝑘
𝑑𝐶𝑘 + 𝑑
𝐺𝐶𝜀
𝜇
   (8) 
                                                   
15 Calculation is proved in Wagstaff, et. al. (2003) “On decomposing the causes of health sector inequalities 
with an application to malnutrition inequalities in Vietnam”, Appendix A2 
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From the equation we can see that changing α does impact changes of C, although it 
does not enter the decomposition. In the case that y represents positive health indicator, 
μ takes positive value and good health favors population with higher social economic 
status (C>0), −
𝐶
𝜇
  0 (
𝑑𝐶
𝑑𝛼
  0). Increasing in α indicates an equal increase in every 
individual’s y, and thus reduces relative health inequality condition. An increase in α 
thus helps the poor to improve their health more, hence reduces the degree of inequality. 
This is an analog from Podder’s article (1993) that equal amount of income increase 
reduces income inequality. In this study y represents the level of negative HAZ, and 
thus we would have positive μ and negative C. Increases in α indicate an equal 
increase in every individual’s y (stunting), and −
𝐶
𝜇
 is positive. Decreases in α mean 
equal reduction on every individual’s stunting level, and −
𝐶
𝜇
𝑑α  0, so equal reduction 
on negative health indicator worsens health inequality. This condition is a mirror image 
of the prior case, and the decrease in α allows the advantageous population to reduce 
the ill condition more.  
Changes of  𝛽𝑘 and ?̅?𝑘 can both affect C directly and indirectly. The direct effect is 
from  𝛽𝑘 and ?̅?𝑘 themselves, and if 𝐶𝑘=0 (variable is equally distributed), the direct 
effect is zero. But usually the unequal distribution of the variable changes C through μ 
indirectly. The indirect effect, could offset the direct effect depending on whether 𝑥𝑘   
distributes more unequally than y. Let’s take an example of positive ?̅?𝑘  and 
negative 𝛽𝑘 (increase in 𝑥𝑘 helps to reduce stunting level), and y represents ill health 
with a positive μ  and negative C. If ?̅?𝑘  increases with the distribution of 𝑥𝑘 
unchanged (inequality among 𝑥𝑘  unchanged), the direct effect makes the health 
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inequality worse (C becomes more negative). We can observe the change from the 
equation or follow the logic that inequality inside 𝑥𝑘 generates more inequality in y 
disfavoring the poor. The indirect effect operates through μ. Increases in ?̅?𝑘 decrease 
μ, thus making C more negative. In this case, the direct and indirect effects reinforce 
each other. However, if we consider another case where y represents a positive health 
outcome with positive μ, C,  𝛽𝑘, ?̅?𝑘 and 𝐶𝑘 (𝑥𝑘 helps to improve good health and 
distributes favoring the rich). The direct effect of increasing 𝑥𝑘 worsens inequality in 
y (C becomes more positive). On the other hand, increase in ?̅?𝑘 increases μ , thus 
reducing the level of inequality in y. in this case, direct and indirect effects could offset 
each other depending on whether (𝐶𝑘 − 𝐶) is positive or negative.  
Changes in 𝐶𝑘  affects changes in C positively. The term ∑
𝛽𝑘?̅?𝑘
𝜇𝑘
𝑑𝐶𝑘  indicates 
positive impact of  𝛽𝑘, ?̅?𝑘 and negative impact of μ. So in this case, more unequal 
distributed variable will worsen the HZA inequality.  
 
Data 
Data used for this study come from China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS)16, an 
ongoing project that covers 9 provinces that differ in geographical location, economic 
development and nature resource endowment in China. This project is implemented by 
a collaboration of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the Chinese 
                                                   
16 This research uses data from China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). We thank the National 
Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety, China Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Carolina 
Population Center, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the NIH (R01-HD30880, 
DK056350, and R01-HD38700) and the Fogarty International Center, NIH for financial support for 
the CHNS data collection and analysis files from 1989 to 2006 and both parties plus the China-
Japan Friendship Hospital, Ministry of Health for support for CHNS 2009 and future surveys. 
70 
 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention. The survey uses random cluster, multistage, 
and weighted sampling scheme to draw country samples in each province. More than 
4,400 households and 19,000 individuals are covered by the survey, with a high follow 
up rate. The survey is stratified into individual, family and community level, and I 
analyze individual survey and household survey data in this study. The survey covers 
topics including nutrition and physical examination, health service, social economical 
background, food access, farm production, income and expenditure, family relationship, 
time allocation at home, media exposure, etc. and each panel is linked by individual ID 
and household ID. Unfortunately, there are no weights to adjust the data to make them 
representative for China due to the original survey design17 . Heilongjiang Province 
replaced Liaoning Province in 1997, and due to their geographic adjacency, I followed 
Chen, Eastwood and Yen (2007)’s approach combining these 2 provinces into Northeast. 
Mega cities including Beijing, Shanghai and Chongqing was added in 2011. For 
consistency with Chen et al. (2007) these metropolitan areas are not included in the 
current analysis18. CHNS records data starting from 1989 and updates to 2015. Since 
most panels relevant for this analysis are only updated to 2011, this study will include 
9 years of data: 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011. Every 
observation contains valid entry of positive height value for children under 10-years 
old (120-month), positive19 per capita household income (in Yuan, and I take logarithm 
                                                   
17 “Weights for CHNS”, Barry M Popkin 
18  See footnote and appendix for 2011 analysis including Beijing, Shanghai and Chongqing 
variable. 
19 Negative values are eliminated because the regression needs to take logarithm of per capita 
household income. It turns out that using logarithm of income makes the coefficient more different 
from 0 than using income, and it also makes the model fits better without changing significant 
71 
 
later in regression), household head’s education (in years), and dummy variables 
indicating hukou (urban/rural), gender, and geographic information.  
This study follows that approach in Chen et al. (2007) and focuses on children under 
10 years old. Wagstaff et al. (2003), Ponce et al. (1998), Martorell et al. (1986), 
Kostermans (1994) and Chen (2007) all claim that children’s height is strongly 
influenced by genetic factors after 1020 . Nevertheless, the cutoff age at 5 is more 
consistent with the majority of literature on stunting (Black et al., 2013; Carlson, 2003; 
Li, 1999 etc.), and WHO also separate the children into age groups between 0~2, 2~5 
and 5~19. The health indicator, stunting (height-for-age) z score is calculated according 
to World Health Organization (WHO)’s growth reference tables for children from 0 to 
2 years, 2 to 5 years and 5 to 19 years. Instead of thinking the z score as “taller the 
healthier”, using negative of z score emphasizes the severity of stunting condition. 
Hence stunting z score equals to z score times -1. To calculate the cumulative 
percentage, different signs are eliminated by setting positive z score values to 0. Again, 
this measurement focuses on the individuals with stunting. For the 9 years of data 
analyzed, mean stunt z scores have a downward trend (Table II.1 & Figure II.2), which 
indicates overall better-off of stunting conditions.   
                                                   
level.  
20 Many studies, including WHO, consider height of children under 5 are strongly influenced with 
nutrition. But this study uses 10 as age cutoff because I want to compare my result with Chen’s 
study, and they used children under 10. 
72 
 
 
a) 
 
b) 
Figure II.2: a) Mean z-score value and b) concentration index, selected years from 
1989-2011  
Source: CHNS 1989-2011 
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Table II.1. Sample statistics and concentration indices for available years, 1989-201121 
Variables     1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. 
# of obs. 
(children under 10) 
1597 1893 1631 1174 853 
Household income (1000 Yuan) 0.901 0.565 0.876 0.629 1.230 1.188 2.637 2.193 3.242 4.048 
Household head’s education (year) 6.573 3.943 7.149 3.507 7.250 3.540 6.583 4.028 6.100 4.217 
Child’s age (month) 39.737 22.763 66.616 31.443 71.589 29.090 77.381 32.872 71.866 33.203 
Male 0.535  0.538  0.536  0.549  0.546  
Urban 0.255  0.219  0.210  0.233  0.238  
Jiangsu 0.090  0.088  0.095  0.132  0.110  
Shandong 0.093  0.098  0.099  0.064  0.040  
Henan 0.133  0.114  0.129  0.152  0.127  
Hebei 0.157  0.145  0.151  0.129  0.100  
Hunan 0.109  0.129  0.116  0.086  0.070  
Guangxi 0.149  0.156  0.156  0.133  0.143  
Guizhou 0.137  0.138  0.129  0.145  0.174  
Northeast 0.133  0.132  0.125  0.159  0.237  
Mean Stunting z score 1.458 1.139 1.404 1.034 1.290 0.991 1.043 0.949 1.002 0.997 
Concentration index -0.088  -0.099  -0.081  -0.079  -0.127  
 
 
                                                   
21 Sample statistics from 1989-2000 is close to Chen, Eastwood and Yen (2007)’s result with minor differences. In the literature they use “community access to bus 
stop” as an independent variable, but unfortunately community level data is not open to free access. 
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Table II.1 continue: Sample statistics and concentration indices for 1989-2011 CHNS data 
Variables     2004 2006 2009 201122 
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. 
# of obs. 
(children under 10) 
805 734 787 1325 
Household income (1000 Yuan) 4.414 4.615 4.911 7.345 7.714 7.782 12.422 12.815 
Household head’s education (year) 7.483 3.479 6.831 4.066 7.013 3.812 8.162 4.157 
Child’s age (month) 66.616 34.159 67.399 34.100 65.919 32.810 60.099 33.731 
Male 0.535  0.550  0.560  0.541  
Urban 0.197  0.189  0.211  0.375  
Jiangsu 0.103  0.086  0.107  0.060  
Shandong 0.051  0.084  0.062  0.051  
Henan 0.128  0.128  0.150  0.066  
Hebei 0.071  0.074  0.071  0.048  
Hunan 0.070  0.101  0.129  0.090  
Guangxi 0.164  0.185  0.232  0.159  
Guizhou 0.212  0.192  0.120  0.078  
Northeast 0.200  0.150  0.129  0.070  
Mean Stunting z score 1.012 1.153 1.004 1.179 0.771 1.194 0.712 1.432 
Concentration index -0.107  -0.080  -0.141  -0.198  
                                                   
22 2011 survey for the first time adds households in mega cities: Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing, accounted for 0.106, 0.118, 0.153 of 2011 data that satisfying 
conditions.    
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In the CHNS survey, household income is calculated from direct questionnaire response 
about income, summation of market and non-market activities, including nonmonetary 
government subsidies, and reposes to questions about expenditures. The data collecting 
method makes the income data good quality but deviates from the approach used in the 
China Statistical Yearbook. Chen et al. (2007) find income before adjusting to inflation 
consist more with national statistics than adjusted income. Another measurement, the 
Consumer Price Index is also available in adjusted and unadjusted form. However, 
China’s CPI excludes housing price during calculation and considering housing 
occupies a large portion of household expenditure, this variable is not used to measure 
household economic status. Wagstaff et al. (2003) used expenditure as the social 
economic status measure. This study uses income instead of expenditure because of 
limitation due to expenditure data structure. The response rate for expenditure is low in 
the data set and including too many 0 entries severally impact the data sensitivity.  
We observe an obvious upward trend in per capita household income (Table II.1), which 
is consistent with a developing economy and raising price level in the past 20 years in 
China. The number of observations declines since 1991, and it reflects the reduction of 
children under 10-years old due to the one-child policy and thus a declining population 
base. Until 2011, 3 mega cities were covered in the survey and increased the survey 
response numbers. I use household head’s education to represent parents’ education 
level because Chinese family usually have high marriage matching level and education 
level of parents are highly corelated (Yeoh et al, 2017 and Whyte 1992). Household 
head’s education is relatively constant with standard deviation of about 4 years across 
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all the years. The highest education level in data set is 4th year of college and above, so 
I use 18 years of education as a cut of for those who receive higher than college level 
education. Nevertheless, the proportion in this category is small (0.09) among the data 
set, so using 18 as a cut off has little impact on the results. Children’s average age is 
about 65 months other than 1989, which is only 40 months. Boys’ percentage in total 
sample is constantly a little bit above a half, and urban residents accounts for about 20% 
throughout all years.   
The concentration curves represent stunting z score accumulated by ranking per capita  
household income from low to high (Figure II.3). The concentration indices are 
negative throughout all the years, also showing downward trend. Negative indices 
represent that the poor suffer more from stunting, and larger the absolute value of the 
concentration index, more unequal among the sample. The concentration indices 
fluctuate moderately around -0.08 ~ -0.1 from year 1989 to 1997, worsen in 2000, 
improve slightly in 2004~2006, and deteriorate even more since then (Figure II.2). The 
variation suggests stunting inequality worsen after 2009. On the other hand, the stunt 
z-score is declining by time, indicating decrease of total stunting among the sample on 
average. The lower 10 percentile of concentration curve closely overlay the diagonal, 
so the inequality among the poorest 10% is subtle, and increase only when income 
increases (Figure II.3). 
For the specific econometric estimation of equation (2), I assume stunting is a linear 
function of per capita income (taking logarithm to respond to skewness towards large 
values), hukou, age (in month), age square, gender, household head’s education and 
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geographic location (provincial fixed effect by adding dummies). The explanatory 
power of the model can be tested by the R-square value. To test the adequacy of OLS 
model, we need to test for the normality, multicollinearity, model specification, and 
homoscedasticity. Normality of residuals is only required for valid hypothesis testing 
and is not required in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the regression coefficients. 
No multi-collinearity says that there should be no linear relationship between the 
independent variables. An important implication of this assumption of OLS regression 
is that there should be sufficient variation in the X’s. A model specification error can 
occur when one or more relevant variables are omitted from the model or one or more 
irrelevant variables are included in the model. If relevant variables are omitted from the 
model, the common variance they share with included variables may be wrongly 
attributed to those variables, and the error term is inflated. On the other hand, if 
irrelevant variables are included in the model, the common variance they share with 
included variables may be wrongly attributed to them. Model specification errors can 
substantially affect the estimate of regression coefficients. OLS assumes that the 
variance of the error term is constant (homoskedasticity). If the error terms do not have 
constant variance, they are said to be heteroskedastic. If this variance is not constant, 
then the linear regression model has heteroscedastic errors and likely to give incorrect 
estimates. However, heteroskedasticity does not result in biased parameter estimates. 
Violation of the OLS assumptions will result in overestimated confidence intervals and 
underestimated p-value, and thus the statistical significance level of the independent 
variable may also be overestimated.
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Figure II.3: HAZ ranked by per capita household income (stunting concentration curve) 
vs. diagonal for available years 1989-2011 
Source: CHNS 1989-2011 and author’s calculation mentioned in Methods section 
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Regression results  
Table II.2. Similarities and differences between my analysis and Chen el al. (2007) 
My analysis  Chen et al. (2007) 
Similarities 
The HAZ Concentration Indices are 
−0.088, −0.099, −0.081, −0.079 and 
−0.127, respectively, for the five 
survey years from 1989-2000. 
The HAZ Concentration Indices are 
−0.110, −0.090, −0.067, −0.086 and 
−0.129, respectively, for the five 
survey years from 1989-2000. 
Per capita household income, urban 
hukou, and household head’s education 
have negative coefficients and help to 
reduce stunting throughout 9 survey 
years. Gender is insignificant explaining 
stunting. 
Per capita household income, urban 
hukou, and household head’s education 
have negative coefficients and help to 
reduce stunting throughout 5 survey 
years. Gender is insignificant explaining 
stunting. 
Compared to Shandong province, 
residence in Northeast has smaller 
probability of suffering stunting whereas 
residence in Hubei, Henan, Hunan, 
Guangxi Guizhou is the opposite. 
Residence in Northeast and Shandong 
has smaller probability of suffering 
stunting whereas residence in Guizhou is 
the opposite. 
  
Per capita household income, urban 
hukou, household head's education and 
residence in Guizhou have negative 
contribution to CI thus disfavor the poor 
in the 9 survey years. Gender’s 
contribution to CI is 0 across 9 years thus 
it does not affect stunting inequality. 
Per capita household income, urban 
hukou household head's education, and 
residence in Guizhou have negative 
contribution to CI thus disfavor the poor 
in the 5 survey years. Gender’s 
contribution to CI is 0 across 5 years thus 
it does not affect stunting inequality. 
Differences and updates  
The average stunting HAZ score keeps 
decreasing in the new decade. 
 
The HAZ Concentration Indices are 
−0.107, −0.080, −0.141, and −0.198 
respectively for the following 
survey years from 2004-2010. 
 
2011-2006 decomposition shows: 
Log per capita household income 
disfavors the poor and contributes 49% to 
ΔC mainly through change in means of 
log per capita household income; 
Change in urban hukou worsens the 
stunting inequality, mainly through 
change in means of urban hukou. 
2000–1993 decomposition shows: 
The provincial difference disfavors the 
poor and contributes 45% of ΔC; 
Log of household income contributes 
49% to ΔC mainly through the change in 
elasticities. 
2011-1997 decomposition shows: 
Log of household income contributes 
2000–1991 decomposition shows: 
The provincial difference disfavors the 
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53% to ΔC mainly through change in 
means of log per capita household 
income; 
Urban hukou worsens the stunting 
inequality because the change in means 
of urban hukou offsets the improvement 
of its effect on total stunting inequality 
and its own inequality. 
poor and contributes 28% of ΔC; 
Log of household income contributes 
21% to ΔC because of deteriorated 
income inequality, 
Urban residence further disfavored the 
poor because of deteriorated urban-rural 
division inequality. 
Chen et al. found that from 1989 to 2000, (i) provincial fixed effect exists in the model, 
(ii) coefficients of logarithm of per capita household income have negative signs, and 
the absolute value of the coefficient declines over year, (iii) coefficients of household 
head’s education have negative signs but are not statistically significant after 1991 (iv) 
coefficients of children’s age have an inverse-U shaped relationship with stunting z 
score. My findings do not completely agree with Chen’s finding because (i) I drop the 
variable “community access to bus stop” due to data access limitation and (ii) I drop 
one provincial dummy variable for provincial fixed effect in regression. There are some 
similarities between the results: other than few exceptions, logarithm per capital income, 
urban hukou and household head’s education years all have negative signs, which 
indicates these three determinants help to reduce inequality of stunting inequality, 
which consist with Chen’s findings.  
The coefficients of log per capita household income on stunting are negative throughout 
all the years (Table II.3), and 6 out of 9 coefficients are statistically significant. 
Coefficients for urban hukou are also negative except 2009 (which is not statistically 
significant), and 7 out of 9 are statistically significant. The absolute values of urban 
coefficients have a declining trend and indicates shrinking urban-rural difference. This 
result represents that higher household income and urban Hukou can help reduce the 
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Table II.3. OLS regression of relationship between HAZ scores and explanatory variables for available years, 1989-2011   
Explanatory Variable23 1989 t 1991 t 1993 t 1997 t 
Log per capita household income  -0.108 -3.61 -0.143 -5 -0.114 -4.22 -0.066 -2.04 
Hukou (Urban=1) -0.454 -7.25 -0.452 -8.2 -0.344 -5.78 -0.253 -3.99 
Children’s age in month 0.045 10.01 0.011 3.55 0.005 1.31 0.009 2.47 
Children’s age square /100 -0.046 -8.79 -0.010 -4.24 -0.004* -1.67 -0.006 -2.36 
Gender (Male=1) 0.0221 0.43 -0.023 -0.53 -0.004 -0.09 -0.002 -0.03 
Household’s head education in year -0.014 -2.07 -0.016 -2.46 -0.010 -1.41 0.003 0.4 
Jiangsu 0.296 2.45 0.149 1.47 0.005 0.05 0.074 0.59 
Henan 0.262 2.36 0.193 2 0.166 1.66 0.028 0.23 
Hubei 0.456 4.23 0.349 3.87 0.284 2.97 0.352 2.8 
Hunan 0.645 5.59 0.535 5.8 0.460 4.58 0.403 2.98 
Guangxi 0.551 5.08 0.592 6.62 0.378 3.97 0.391 3.14 
Guizhou 0.777 7 0.751 8.07 0.738 7.48 0.857 6.9 
Northeast -0.149 -1.34 -0.181 -1.97 -0.174 -1.76 -0.132 -1.08 
Cons 1.141 4.9 2.025 9.01 1.882 8.4 1.089 3.88 
R^2 0.186  0.174  0.119  0.140  
F for regression 27.86  30.43  16.82  14.51  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
23 Shandong as base Province is omitted. 
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Table 3 continue 
Explanatory Variable 2000 t 2004 t 2006 t 2009 t 201124 t 
Log per capita household income  -0.097 -2.52 -0.037 -0.89 -0.057 -1.42 -0.054 -1.22 -0.111 -2.81 
Hukou (Urban=1) -0.316 -4.09 -0.214 -2.09 -0.153 -1.36 0.098 0.94 -0.233 -2.47 
Children’s age in month 0.005 1.21 0.005 1.03 -0.002 -0.41 -0.026 -5.08 0.007 1.58 
Children’s age square /100 -0.005 -1.71 -0.006 -1.53 -0.001 -0.27 0.016 4.05 -0.009 -2.43 
Gender (Male=1) 0.011 0.17 -0.076 -1 0.065 0.77 -0.065 -0.79 0.044 0.57 
Household’s head education in year -0.007 -0.98 -0.012 -0.99 -0.005 -0.41 -0.030 -2.6 -0.011 -1.08 
Jiangsu -0.260 -1.43 -0.053 -0.25 -0.526 -2.59 -0.568 -2.77 -0.412 -2.42 
Henan 0.037 0.2 0.325 1.62 0.046 0.24 0.044 0.23 0.329* 1.95 
Hubei 0.150 0.8 -0.022 -0.1 -0.035 -0.16 -0.135 -0.61 0.250 1.33 
Hunan 0.172 0.88 0.559 2.54 0.142 0.73 0.125 0.63 0.191 1.33 
Guangxi 0.172 0.97 0.656 3.38 0.355 2.03 0.006 0.03 0.089 0.73 
Guizhou 0.663 3.8 0.862 4.54 0.608 3.51 0.336 1.66 0.371 2.37 
Northeast -0.386 -2.28 -0.112 -0.59 -0.142 -0.79 -0.424 -2.13 -0.304 -1.86 
Cons 1.777 4.85 1.131 2.84 1.560 4.06 2.361 5.39 1.808 4.81 
R^2 0.186  0.151  0.103  0.113  0.059  
F for regression 14.73  10.86  6.36  7.58  6.30  
Notes: Robust t statistics available; variables with bold text have 5% statistical significance level or better. Due to violation of OLS assumptions 
in model test, the significance level may be overestimated.  
Source: CHNS 1989-2011 and author’s calculation yi = 𝛼 ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘     
 
                                                   
24 2011 regression result including Beijing, Shanghai and Chongqing is included in Appendix. 
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probability of stunting . Child’s age has inverted U-shaped relationship with the 
stunting z-score in 1989~2004, and 2011 but in 2004 the effect is not statistically 
important. The turning point is around 5 years old, which consists with Chen’s and 
Wagstaff’s study. 2006’s result is also not statistically important, whereas in 2009 
child’s age has a significant U-shaped relationship with stunt z-score. Gender’s effect 
to stunting z score are inconclusive because the results have both signs and half of them 
are statistically insignificant. Inconclusive gender effects may represent limited 
discrimination between boys and girls, or that the model is not suitable to reflect gender 
differences. Household head’s education (in years) has negative coefficients except 
1997, but only 3 of them are statistically significant. The geographic coefficients should 
be interpreted comparing with the base Province Shandong (omitted in regression). 
Henan, Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou have positive coefficients, while Northeast has 
negative coefficients throughout all years. On the other hand, Jiangsu and Hubei’s 
coefficients have both signs (Hubei’s statistically significant coefficients are positive). 
The result indicates that comparing to Shandong province, children from Northeast 
have less possibility to suffer from stunting and children from Hubei, Henan, Hunan, 
Guangxi and Guizhou are more likely to be shorter than the standard height. The result 
could attribute to different resource endowment and genetic factors among various 
provinces. Guizhou province is less developed than Shandong province, and it is proven 
to have statistically significant positive coefficients across all years. Average adult 
height by provinces from the China Statistic Year Book shows that people from northern 
China are typically taller than those from southern China , and the fact could explain 
88 
 
the negative coefficient for Northeast province. As for Jiangsu, where is geographically 
adjacent to Shandong, and has very close GDP with Shandong, it’s possible that no 
single factor could outweigh the other, hence the coefficients have both signs. 
Nevertheless, the provincial coefficient in Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou 
are becoming less important after 2000, indicating cross-provincial migration and 
economic development may surpass the genetic influences. 
As mentioned in Methods section, we need to test the OLS model due to various reasons. 
The R square is relatively low (although not uncommonly low for large cross-sectional 
datasets), indicating limited ability of this model to explain and predict children’s 
stunning condition. Normality test (Figure II.A1 in appendix) indicates the residual is 
not normally distributed, thus the standard errors of OLS estimates is not perfectly 
reliable, which means the confidence intervals would be too narrow. However, 
normality is not required in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the regression 
coefficients. Multicollinearity test (Table II.A2 in appendix) proves explanatory 
variables are not linearly related to each other. As a rule of thumb, a variable whose VIF 
values are greater than 10 may be problematic. The model specification test (Figure 
II.A2 in appendix) has a statistically significant p-value and we have to reject the null 
hypothesis. The result indicates that there exist omitted variables that could have better 
define the model. The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
(Figure II.A3 in appendix) shows a statistically significant p-value and we have to 
accept the alternative hypothesis that the variance is not homogenous. Cross-sectional 
studies are more likely to have heteroscedasticity because they often have values differ 
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in a big range. I already took logarithm of the income but heteroscedasticity still exists. 
While heteroscedasticity does not cause bias in the coefficient estimates, it does make 
them less precise. Heteroscedasticity increases the variance of the coefficient estimates 
and tends to produce p-values that are smaller than the actual value, and in turn a 
statistically important coefficient could be not statistically important. Thus, the 
statistical significance of the reported coefficients should be interpreted with caution, 
because the estimated confidence intervals may be too small in most cases. 
 
Decomposition results   
The elasticities and concentration indices of determinants (Tables II.4 and II.5) are 
calculated based on regression result and by the approach mentioned in Methods section. 
Gender has no statistically significant influence on stunting inequality (Tables II.6 and 
II.7).
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Table II.4. Elasticity of regression coefficients of each explanatory variable at mean of HAZ scores for available years, 1989-2011   
Elasticity  1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 2011 
Log per capita household income  -0.479 -0.089 -0.599 -0.478 -0.746 -0.293 -0.450 -0.600 -1.402 
Hukou (Urban=1) -0.080 -0.070 -0.056 -0.057 -0.075 -0.042 -0.029 0.027 -0.123 
Children’s age in month 1.231 0.513 0.254 0.649 0.358 0.320 -0.150 -2.184 0.614 
Children’s age square /100 -0.655 -0.368 -0.196 -0.414 -0.323 -0.312 -0.063 1.090 -0.598 
Gender (Male=1) 0.008 -0.009 -0.002 -0.001 0.006 -0.040 0.036 -0.047 0.034 
Household’s head education in year -0.063 -0.080 -0.054 0.017 -0.045 -0.089 -0.031 -0.269 -0.130 
Jiangsu 0.018 0.009 0.000 0.009 -0.029 -0.005 -0.045 -0.079 -0.035 
Henan 0.024 0.016 0.017 0.004 0.005 0.041 0.006 0.009 0.030 
Hubei 0.049 0.036 0.033 0.044 0.015 -0.002 -0.003 -0.012 0.017 
Hunan 0.048 0.049 0.041 0.033 0.012 0.039 0.014 0.021 0.024 
Guangxi 0.056 0.066 0.046 0.050 0.025 0.106 0.065 0.002 0.020 
Guizhou 0.073 0.074 0.074 0.119 0.115 0.181 0.116 0.052 0.041 
Northeast -0.014 -0.017 -0.017 -0.020 -0.091 -0.022 -0.021 -0.071 -0.030 
Note: 𝜂𝑘=𝛽𝑘 ∗ ?̅?𝑘/?̅? 
Source: CHNS 1989-2011 and author’s calculation  
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Table II.5. Concentration Indices of each explanatory variable (ranked by per capita household income) for available years, 1989-2011   
Concentration Indices 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 2011 
Log per capita household income  0.079 0.071 0.074 0.062 0.066 0.073 0.077 0.063 0.066 
Hukou (Urban=1) 0.341 0.332 0.294 0.299 0.346 0.320 0.267 0.202 0.245 
Children’s age in month 0.012 0.001 0.017 0.000 0.020 0.008 -0.006 0.027 -0.014 
Children’s age square /100 0.026 -0.001 0.027 -0.001 0.030 0.018 -0.005 0.042 -0.025 
Gender (Male=1) -0.004 0.002 0.011 -0.004 -0.012 0.011 -0.016 0.011 0.009 
Household’s head education in year 0.029 0.043 0.036 0.052 0.028 0.088 0.115 0.078 0.109 
Jiangsu 0.110 0.141 0.061 0.231 0.441 0.532 0.326 0.351 0.234 
Henan -0.020 -0.201 -0.336 -0.192 -0.376 -0.251 -0.214 -0.202 -0.439 
Hubei -0.132 0.139 -0.074 -0.033 -0.123 -0.028 -0.074 0.130 0.056 
Hunan 0.106 0.058 0.096 0.117 0.128 0.125 0.117 0.024 -0.087 
Guangxi 0.098 -0.088 0.132 0.024 0.027 -0.113 -0.149 -0.190 -0.312 
Guizhou -0.223 -0.305 -0.061 -0.210 -0.143 -0.200 -0.074 -0.047 -0.159 
Northeast 0.004 0.159 0.142 0.092 0.053 0.121 0.166 0.175 0.089 
Note: 𝐶𝑘 = 
2
𝑛𝑘?̅?𝑘
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑘
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑅𝑖𝑘 − 1, where 𝑦𝑖𝑘 is the explanatory variable k ranked by per capita household income    
Source: CHNS 1989-2011 and author’s calculation 
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Table II.6. Explanatory variables’ contribution to Concentration indices for available years, 1989-2011   
Explanatory variables’  
contribution to Concentration 
indices 
1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 2011 
Log per capita household income  -0.038 -0.006 -0.044 -0.030 -0.049 -0.021 -0.035 -0.038 -0.093 
Hukou (Urban=1) -0.027 -0.023 -0.016 -0.017 -0.026 -0.013 -0.008 0.005 -0.030 
Children’s age in month 0.015 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.007 0.003 0.001 -0.059 -0.009 
Children’s age square /100 -0.017 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.010 -0.006 0.000 0.046 0.015 
Gender (Male=1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Household’s head education in year -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.008 -0.004 -0.021 -0.014 
Jiangsu 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.013 -0.003 -0.015 -0.028 -0.008 
Henan 0.000 -0.003 -0.006 -0.001 -0.002 -0.010 -0.001 -0.002 -0.013 
Hubei -0.006 0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.001 
Hunan 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.001 -0.002 
Guangxi 0.005 -0.006 0.006 0.001 0.001 -0.012 -0.010 0.000 -0.006 
Guizhou -0.016 -0.023 -0.005 -0.025 -0.016 -0.036 -0.009 -0.002 -0.007 
Northeast 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.012 -0.003 
Residual -.0126 -.0029 -.4892 -.0137 -.0157 -.0035 -.0010 -.0246 -.0223 
Note: Explanatory variables’  contribution to Concentration indices = 𝜂𝑘 ∗ 𝐶𝑘 
Source: CHNS 1989-2011 and author’s calculation 
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Table II.7. Changes of concentration indices between 2011 and other available years 
Changes of concentration indices 11-89 11-91 11-93 11-97 11-00 11-04 11-06 11-09 
Log per capita household income  -0.055  -0.086  -0.048  -0.063  -0.043  -0.071  -0.058  -0.055  
Hukou (Urban=1) -0.003  -0.007  -0.014  -0.013  -0.004  -0.017  -0.022  -0.036  
Children’s age in month -0.023  -0.009  -0.013  -0.009  -0.016  -0.011  -0.009  0.050  
Children’s age square /100 0.032  0.015  0.020  0.015  0.025  0.021  0.015  -0.031  
Gender (Male=1) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  
Household’s head education in year -0.012  -0.011  -0.012  -0.015  -0.013  -0.006  -0.011  0.007  
Jiangsu -0.010  -0.009  -0.008  -0.010  0.005  -0.006  0.006  0.020  
Henan -0.013  -0.010  -0.007  -0.012  -0.011  -0.003  -0.012  -0.011  
Hubei 0.007  -0.004  0.003  0.002  0.003  0.001  0.001  0.003  
Hunan -0.007  -0.005  -0.006  -0.006  -0.004  -0.007  -0.004  -0.003  
Guangxi -0.012  0.000  -0.012  -0.007  -0.007  0.006  0.003  -0.006  
Guizhou 0.010  0.016  -0.002  0.018  0.010  0.030  0.002  -0.004  
Northeast -0.003  0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.002  0.000  0.001  0.010  
Source: CHNS 1989-2011 and author’s calculation 
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Inequality in urban hukou (except 2009), per capita household income and household 
head’s education worsen the inequality in child stunting (numerically make 
concentration indices more negative), thus disfavor the poor. However, the inequality 
of household head’s education has fairly small impact on the inequality of child stunting, 
accounts for only -0.054 of a total of -0.885 throughout all years. Above results are 
consistent with Chen et al. (2007). Inequality in age and inequality in age square almost 
offset each other and have slightly negative contribution to the inequality of child 
stunting. Residing in Jiangsu favors the poor before 2000 and disfavors the poor 
afterwards. Residing in Hebei and Guangxi have mixed effects on inequality. Residing 
in Guizhou, Northeast and Henan except 1989 disfavors the poor, and residing in Hunan 
expect 2011 favors the poor. The result indicates that children living in poor households 
in provinces with negative contribution to concentration indices expose to larger 
possibility of being stunting.   
The differences (in Table II.7) between child stunting inequality in 2011 and that in 
every other year are calculated by subtracting regressors’ contribution to concentration 
indices (from Table II.6). The deterioration of child stunting inequality is mostly caused 
by change in log of per capita household income and changes in other factors have 
relatively small effect comparing to household income. The net change of inequalities 
in child’s age is 0.072, and the positive sign indicates the change mitigates the 
inequality in stunting score. Changes in urban hukou, household head’s education 
(expect in 2009 and 2011), residing in Henan and Hunan have opposite signs and the 
changes broaden the stunting inequality. Change in gender is negligible.    
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However, we cannot tell whether the changes in outcome inequality are due to changes 
in inequality of the determinates or due to changes in elasticities merely based on 
equation (5) (Table II.6 and II.7). Oaxaca-type decomposition is calculated based on 
equation (6) and (7). If the absolute value of ΔC*η is larger than Δη*C, it means the 
change is influenced more by change of inequality rather than change of elasticity, and 
vice versa. There are 36 combinations of 2 period comparison for 9 years, and I choose 
2006 and 2011 because these two years differ the most in concentration index after 2000. 
The concentration index was improved from 2000 to 2006, and it worsens after 2006. 
The decomposition analysis for 2006-2011 (Table II.8) indicates that that for residing 
in Henan, change in elasticity and change in inequality reinforce each other. Other 
provincial effects are small and in general offset each other. For household income, the 
improvement in income inequality favors the poor, but could not overweight the 
changes in elasticities, and changes in income in total contributes to 49% to changes in 
deterioration of stunting inequality from 2006 to 2011. Changes in urban hukou 
improve the stunting inequality, mainly comes from changes in elasticities. Change in 
gender has slightly positive impact on stunting inequality from changes in inequalities 
of the variable itself. Household head’s education contributes to the stunting inequality 
by changes in elasticities.     
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Table II.8. Oaxaca-type decompositions for change in inequality 2006 and 2011 
Variables Eq(6) Eq(7) Total 
ΔC*η Δη*C ΔC*η Δη*C Total Percent 
Log per capita household income  0.015 -0.073 0.005 -0.063 -0.058 49% 
Hukou (Urban=1) 0.003 -0.025 0.001 -0.023 -0.022 19% 
Children’s age in month -0.005 -0.005 0.001 -0.011 -0.009 8% 
Children’s age square /100 0.012 0.003 0.001 0.013 0.015 -12% 
Gender (Male=1) 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -1% 
Household’s head education in year 0.001 -0.011 0.000 -0.011 -0.011 9% 
Jiangsu 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.006 -6% 
Henan -0.007 -0.005 -0.001 -0.011 -0.012 10% 
Hubei 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -1% 
Hunan -0.005 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 3% 
Guangxi -0.003 0.007 -0.011 0.014 0.003 -3% 
Guizhou -0.003 0.006 -0.010 0.012 0.002 -2% 
Northeast 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -1% 
Residual      -0.030 26% 
Total 0.016 -0.103 -0.010 -0.077 -0.117  
Note: ∆𝐶 = ∑ 𝜂𝑘(𝐶𝑘𝑡𝑘 − 𝐶𝑘(𝑡−1)) + ∑ 𝐶𝑘(𝑡−1)𝑘 (𝜂𝑘𝑡 − 𝜂𝑘(𝑡−1)) + ∆(𝐺𝜀𝑡/?̅?𝑡)           (6) 
             ∆𝐶 = ∑ 𝜂𝑘(𝑡−1)(𝐶𝑘𝑡𝑘 − 𝐶𝑘(𝑡−1)) + ∑ 𝐶𝑘𝑡𝑘 (𝜂𝑘𝑡 − 𝜂𝑘(𝑡−1)) + ∆(𝐺𝜀𝑡/?̅?𝑡)          (7) 
Source: CHNS 1989-2011 and author’s calculation 
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I also choose to compare 1997 and 2011 because 1997 has the smallest concentration 
index while 2011 has the worst stunting inequality (in absolute value). 1997-2011 
decomposition result (Table II.9) shows for per capita household income, residing in 
Jiangsu, Henan, and Northeast, changes in elasticities of the variables and changes in 
inequalities of variables reinforce each other, and worsen the stunting inequities from 
1997 to 2011. The changes in income mainly comes from changes in income elasticity. 
Inequality of hukou status narrows from 1997 to 2011, but changes in its elasticity offset 
the improvement and contribute to expansion of stunting inequality. Overall, child’s 
age reduces stunting inequality mainly through changes in age inequality. Gender has 
no impact on the result. In general, household head’s education worsens the stunting 
inequality by changing in elasticity.  
We could explore more details in elasticities which Oaxaca-type decompositions could 
not tell us: the changes in elasticities might offset each other – the coefficients might 
decrease while the means of variable might rise. As Wagstaff (2003) mentioned, this 
decomposition is accurate only for very small changes, hence the results in Table II.7 
do not match those in Table II.10 exactly. Log per capita household income and child’s 
age in month differ the most because these two variables account for upper two drivers 
for inequality change.  
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Table II.9. Oaxaca-type decompositions for change in inequality 1997 and 2011 
Variables Eq(6) Eq(7) Total 
ΔC*η Δη*C ΔC*η Δη*C Total Percent 
Log per capita household income  -0.006 -0.057 -0.002 -0.061 -0.063 53% 
Hukou (Urban=1) 0.007 -0.020 0.003 -0.016 -0.013 11% 
Children’s age in month -0.009 0.000 -0.009 0.000 -0.009 7% 
Children’s age square /100 0.014 0.000 0.010 0.005 0.015 -12% 
Gender (Male=1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0% 
Household’s head education in year -0.007 -0.008 0.001 -0.016 -0.015 13% 
Jiangsu 0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.010 -0.010 9% 
Henan -0.007 -0.005 -0.001 -0.011 -0.012 10% 
Hubei 0.002 0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.002 -2% 
Hunan -0.005 -0.001 -0.007 0.001 -0.006 5% 
Guangxi -0.007 -0.001 -0.017 0.009 -0.007 6% 
Guizhou 0.002 0.016 0.006 0.012 0.018 -16% 
Northeast 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 1% 
Residual      -0.018 15% 
Total -0.016 -0.085 -0.011 -0.089 -0.119  
Note: ∆𝐶 = ∑ 𝜂𝑘(𝐶𝑘𝑡𝑘 − 𝐶𝑘(𝑡−1)) + ∑ 𝐶𝑘(𝑡−1)𝑘 (𝜂𝑘𝑡 − 𝜂𝑘(𝑡−1)) + ∆(𝐺𝜀𝑡/?̅?𝑡)           (6) 
             ∆𝐶 = ∑ 𝜂𝑘(𝑡−1)(𝐶𝑘𝑡𝑘 − 𝐶𝑘(𝑡−1)) + ∑ 𝐶𝑘𝑡𝑘 (𝜂𝑘𝑡 − 𝜂𝑘(𝑡−1)) + ∆(𝐺𝜀𝑡/?̅?𝑡)          (7) 
Source: CHNS 1989-2011 and author’s calculation 
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Table II.10. Total differential decomposition of changes in inequality  
2006-2011 1997-2011  
α β ?̅? CI 𝐺𝐶𝜀 Total α β ?̅? CI 𝐺𝐶𝜀 Total 
Log per capita household income   -0.042 -0.067 0.003 
 
-0.106  -0.016 -0.087 -0.001 
 
-0.104 
Hukou (Urban=1)  -0.005 -0.010 0.001 
 
-0.014  0.002 -0.013 0.003 
 
-0.008 
Children’s age in month  0.047 0.001 0.001 
 
0.050  -0.009 -0.011 -0.009 
 
-0.029 
Children’s age square / 100  -0.034 0.001 0.001 
 
-0.031  -0.015 0.011 0.010 
 
0.005 
Gender (Male=1)  -0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
0.000  0.002 0.000 0.000 
 
0.002 
Household head’s education in year  -0.009 -0.001 0.000 
 
-0.010  -0.012 0.001 0.001 
 
-0.010 
Jiangsu  0.004 0.006 0.004 
 
0.014  -0.019 -0.002 0.000 
 
-0.021 
Henan  -0.005 0.000 -0.001 
 
-0.006  -0.005 0.000 -0.001 
 
-0.006 
Hubei  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000  -0.001 -0.001 0.004 
 
0.002 
Hunan  0.001 0.000 -0.003 
 
-0.002  -0.003 0.000 -0.007 
 
-0.010 
Guangxi  0.003 0.001 -0.011 
 
-0.007  -0.004 0.001 -0.017 
 
-0.020 
Guizhou  0.000 0.000 -0.010 
 
-0.011  0.009 0.007 0.006 
 
0.022 
Northeast  -0.006 0.003 0.002 
 
-0.002  -0.004 0.002 0.000 
 
-0.003 
Cons 0.02     0.02 0.05     0.05 
Residual  
   
-0.030 -0.030  
   
-0.018 -0.018 
Total 0.02 -0.046 -0.067 -0.012 -0.030 -0.136 0.05 -0.076 -0.093 -0.010 -0.018 -0.142 
Column as % -15% 34% 50% 9% 22% 
 
-38% 53% 65% 7% 13% 
 
Note: ∆C = −
𝐶
𝜇
𝑑𝛼 + ∑
?̅?𝑘
𝜇𝑘
(𝐶𝑘 − 𝐶)𝑑𝛽𝑘 + ∑
𝛽𝑘
𝜇𝑘
(𝐶𝑘 − 𝐶)𝑑?̅?𝑘 + ∑
𝛽𝑘?̅?𝑘
𝜇𝑘
𝑑𝐶𝑘 + 𝑑
𝐺𝐶𝜀
𝜇
 
Source: CHNS 1989-2011 and author’s calculation
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For 2006 to 2011 and 1997 to 2011 total differential decomposition, overall, (a) changes 
in means of variable, (b) changes in their coefficients and (c) changes in their own 
inequalities all contribute to reinforcing the widening of stunting inequality. In both 
decompositions, the absolute value of total changes in determinants’ inequality is 
smaller than changes of total stunting inequality. So, the inequality increases in child 
stunting is larger than inequalities rising in its determinants. We can also assess the 
magnitudes of these three components contributing to total stunting inequality. For 
example, in both total decompositions, change in means of log per capita household 
income contributes more than change in its coefficients and inequalities.     
Total differential decompositions (Table II.10) also helps us to explore offsetting effects 
in elasticities. Sample statistics (in Table II.1) show that sample residing in Northeast 
province decrease from 15% to 7% from 2006 to 2011. The decrease in x _̅k tends to 
make C less negative. Meanwhile, the effect of residing in Northeast (β_k) seems to 
enhance, and in turn worsen the outcome inequality. Oaxaca decomposition (in Table 
II.8) indicates that the effects roughly cancel out, that Δη*C is -0.001 in both Oaxaca 
decompositions using equation (6) and (7). Total differential decomposition (Table II.10) 
informs us that change in coefficient contributes -0.006 to C (worsen stunting inequality) 
while decrease in mean rises total inequality by 0.003 and change in variable’s own 
inequality decreases C by 0.002.  
Total differential decomposition (Table II.10) could also help to test and prove previous 
results. For example, we can find that more people get urban hukou, the impact of 
hukou has declined, and the inequality among population with urban hukou has declines 
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in the decade. From 1997 to 2011, the proportion of urban hukou holder rises from 23% 
to 38% (in Table II.1), and the rise in mean tends to strengthen the malnutrition 
inequality. The regression result (in Table II.3, -0.253 in 1997 and -0.233 in 2011) 
shows the effect of urban hukou on stunting has declined (the absolute values of 
coefficient get smaller) and the effect seems to narrow the stunting inequality. 
Concentration indices (in Table II.5) show the urban hukou distributes more equally in 
2011 (0.245) than in 1997 (0.299) and the effect should also reduce the inequality level. 
Total differential decomposition (in Table II.10) shows that change in mean contributes 
-0.013 towards the total change in C, while change in coefficients and C_k help to offset 
the total inequality by 0.002 and 0.003 accordingly. The results verify each other. 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
The empirical results show that from 1989 to 2011, the average stunting level of China’s 
children under 10 has declined, but the stunting inequality was not reduced with the 
average improvement of stunting condition. Stunting inequality fluctuates from 1989 
to 2006 and worsens in 2009 and 2011. And the inequality among the poorest 10% is 
negligible. 
This article uses different decomposition methods in Wagstaff’s article (2003) to 
explore the causes of inequality and causes of the inequality changes over different time 
periods. Equation (3) allows us to disclose the inequality of determinants’ contribution 
to the total stunting inequality. Equation (8) allows us to unmask the possible causes 
for changing inequality over time: the changes could come from (a) changes in means 
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of determinants, (b) changes in the distribution of the determinants, and (c) the changes 
of their effects on health indicator. The implication of the total decomposition reveals 
the potential tradeoff between improvement of mean of variable of interest (y) and 
reduction of stunting inequality. In our case, the notable income growth in China 
reduces average stunting level. However, increased income exaggerates stunting 
inequality by increasing income inequality’s contribution to stunting inequality. 
From 1989 to 2011, the causal interpretation of regression results indicates household 
income, urban hukou, household head’s education and residing in Northeast have 
dampening effect on child stunting level. Among them, the data also shows shrinking 
urban-rural difference. This result represents that higher household income, urban 
hukou, higher parents’ education level can help reduce the probability of children 
malnutrition reflected on their height. The geographic disparity could be attributed to 
different development level and genetic differences in north and south China (for 
children older than 60 months). 
Decomposition shows inequality in urban hukou (except 2009), per capita household 
income and household head’s education worsen the inequality in child stunting (make 
C more negative), thus disfavor the poor. However, the inequality of household head’s 
education has relatively small impact on the inequality of child stunting.  
Total differential decomposition informs us that both in short run (2006 to 2011) and 
long run (1997 to 2011), the deterioration of stunting inequality is caused by the 
combined effect from changes in means of variable, changes in their coefficients and 
changes in their own inequalities. In case of household income, change in means 
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contributes more than change in its coefficients and inequalities.  
My analysis confirms and further explains some results from Chen et al. (2007). (i) 
Income growth does help reduce the average stunting level but worsens inequality 
mainly by change in its mean. (ii) Household head’s education worsens the stunting 
inequality mostly from the changes in its effect on stunting level. (iii) Gender does not 
affect significantly in stunting inequality. (iv) Increasing urban hukou contributes 
positively in stunting inequalities (v) Provincial effects exist and contribute to total 
inequality.  
After 2000, the average stunting score keeps declining during the new decade, whereas 
stunting inequality ameliorates until 2006 and worsens since then. Log per capita 
household income, urban hukou, and household’s head education continue to contribute 
to stunting inequality. Residence in Jiangsu is helpful to reduce stunting inequality 
before 2000 but it starts to attribute to inequality after since.  
We observe that household income, urban hukou, household head’s education and 
geographic location are influential factors that cause child stunting inequality. 
Compared to more developed countries, policies in China aims to mitigate children 
nutritional inequality is in the beginning phase. In US, school lunch program, Food 
Stamp program and Special Nutrition Supplement program for Women, Infants and 
Children (WIC) have national coverage and have helped to improve nutrition status 
among the low-income population (Carlson, 2003). China has no specific nutrition 
program towards children and pregnant women before 2011. Starting in 2011, State 
Council of China announced “Rural China compulsory education students nutrition 
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improvement program”, and provided meal subsidies for 26 million students at school 
in 680 selected countries (cities) with ¥3 ($0.45) per person per day (250 days per year, 
¥4 for primary students and ¥5 for middle school students with financial difficulties). 
Until the end of 2013, the government has spent over ¥30 billion on the program and 
provided for 32 million rural students. Also in 2011, charity organizations like China 
Social Welfare Foundation worked with domestic well-known social media, journalists 
and philanthropists initiated Free Lunch for Children mutual fund program and 
proposed for donation of ¥3 for each children (raised to ¥4 in 2016). Until 2017, the 
donation has passed ¥333 million and helped 893 schools. However, both programs 
have limitations. First, the amount of each meal subsidy is way too low considering 
current food price. Second, the coverage of the program is limited by geographic 
conditions. Third, these two programs only provide meal subsidy to school students but 
do not cover infants. China has welfare programs25 targeting the poor but there is no 
specific program providing necessary nutrition for the pregnant women and infants. To 
test if the programs effective, future studies can work on data after 2011 if released. 
Also, residual part constitutes approximately 20% in the short run change (2006~2011) 
and 10% in the long run change (1997~2011), which indicates additional variables 
could be explored on affecting children stunting.  
Other than that, the health indicator itself reflects inequality limited to surviving 
children. It does not count for child mortality, especially if gender specific. Also, height 
                                                   
25 For example, Wubaohu program covers population (families) with elderly, disabled and 
orphaned minors without income source, and provides free food, clothes, fuel, housing, and 
health care. (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1994) 
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only presents general absorption of nutrition, but does not fully reflect health conditions 
related to diseases, especially current ones. For example, in Ta-liang Mountains area 
inside Szechwan province, children suffer from high rate of HIV infection due to its 
location (Ta-liang Mountains area is one of the least economic developed areas, 
extremely poor in resources, has very limited transportation access, and it is China’s 
biggest drug-dealing zone).  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table II.A1. 2011 data including mega cities 
Variable β η 𝐶𝑘 Regressors’ 
contribution 
to 𝐶𝑘 
Log per capita household 
income  -0.064 -0.806 0.066 -0.093 
Hukou (Urban=1) -0.184* -0.097 0.245 -0.030 
Children’s age in month 0.007 0.591 -0.014 -0.009 
Children’s age square /100 -0.009** -0.600 -0.025 0.015 
Gender (Male=1) 0.046 0.035 0.009 0.000 
Household’s head education 
in year -0.001 -0.011 0.109 -0.014 
Jiangsu -0.470** -0.040 0.234 -0.008 
Henan 0.329 0.030 -0.439 -0.013 
Hubei 0.216 0.015 0.056 0.001 
Hunan 0.159 0.020 -0.087 -0.002 
Guangxi 0.087 0.019 -0.312 -0.006 
Guizhou 0.372* 0.041 -0.159 -0.007 
Northeast -0.355 -0.035 0.089 -0.003 
Shanghai -0.377* -0.056 0.548 -0.031 
Beijing -0.293 -0.049 -0.159 0.008 
Chongqing 0.255 0.055 0.449 0.025 
Cons 1.329*** -   
R^2 0.071 -   
F for regression 6.26 -   
Total     -0.166 
 
 
 
Figure II.A1. Normality test for OLS regression of HAZ scores on explanatory 
variables, 2000. 
 
 
 
 
       resid          853    0.94271     31.265     8.469    0.00000
                                                                    
    Variable          Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
. swilk resid
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Table II.A2. Multicollinearity test for OLS regression of HAZ scores on explanatory 
variables, 2000. 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
     
agesq 19.54 0.05117 
ageinmonth 19.49 0.0513 
Northeast 5.4 0.185333 
Guizhou 4.54 0.220122 
Guangxi 3.98 0.251044 
Henan 3.85 0.25971 
Jiangsu 3.39 0.295191 
Hubei 3.26 0.307102 
Hunan 2.6 0.384139 
log_hhinc_pc 1.28 0.783662 
urban 1.12 0.889554 
heduyear 1.04 0.96362 
genderM1F0 1.02 0.978399 
     
Mean VIF 5.42   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure II.A2. Model specification test for OLS regression of HAZ scores on 
explanatory variables, 2000. 
If the model is specified correctly, in linktest, _hat should be significant and _hatsq 
shouldn’t. The ovtest suggests we need to reject the null hypothesis and the model has 
                                                                              
       _cons     .2317871   .1462131     1.59   0.113    -.0551939    .5187682
      _hatsq     .2600056   .1386628     1.88   0.061     -.012156    .5321673
        _hat     .4603006   .2966105     1.55   0.121    -.1218742    1.042475
                                                                              
        adjz        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    846.470212       852  .993509638   Root MSE        =     .8986
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1872
    Residual    686.359751       850   .80748206   R-squared       =    0.1892
       Model    160.110461         2  80.0552305   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(2, 850)       =     99.14
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       853
                  Prob > F =      0.0368
                 F(3, 836) =      2.84
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of adjz
. ovtest
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omitted variables.  
 
Figure II.A3. Homoscedasticity test for OLS regression of HAZ scores on explanatory 
variables, 2000. 
 
Large Chi square indicates heteroskedasticity in Breusch-Pagan test. 
  
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =    25.07
         Variables: fitted values of adjz
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
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CHAPTER III 
ASSESSING INTRA-HOUSEHOLD INEQUALITY IN BODY MASS INDEX FOR 
CHINA DURING 1989-2011 
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Introduction  
When data are collected at the household level rather than individual level, intra-
household inequality can be ignored, and the total inequality in health and nutrition 
outcomes can be underestimated. However, specific assessment of intra-household 
inequality, especially for health outcomes, is an underdeveloped research area (Kanbur, 
2016). To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to focus specifically on intra-
household health inequality in China. I am especially interested in whether women and 
children are thinner than male adults in the family, and whether the outcomes change 
with household income levels. The objectives of this article are 1) to assess the 
inequality of intra-household well-being as represented by body mass index (BMI), 2) 
to justify the choice of BMI as well-being indicator, 3) to explore whether the health 
resource depravation exists among family members, and 4) to test the hypothesis of a 
Kuznets curve relationship between intra-household inequality and measurement of 
well-being. 
This article measures health inequality with the BMI, which is calculated by one’s 
weight in kilograms divided by height squared in centimeters. BMI in a certain range 
suggest better health condition and BMI outside the thresholds can indicate health 
problems. Individuals with low BMI may indicate insufficient nutritional intake and/or 
in other health conditions. On the other hand, BMI higher than the upper limitation 
points to health problems linked to obesity. Thus, BMI reflects individual access and 
consumptions over health-related resources, including food, health care and sanitation. 
Advantages and disadvantages of using BMI as health indicator are discussed in the 
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Methods section. In this article I treat BMI analogous to income in the standard 
inequality literature: well-being is measured by BMI and inequality is measured by its 
dispersion in distribution. Using individual level and household level well-being 
indicators bias the measurement of inequality. Therefore, I am interested in the intra-
household inequality calculated based on a non-income well-being indicator, and the 
extent to which it is attributable to the total inequality.   
Intra-household inequality is important because it affects policies in various ways. 
Underestimation of total inequality by omitting intra-household inequality distorts the 
achievement of inequality/poverty reduction programs. Resource allocation patterns 
inside the family influences the effect of minimum wage polices and public transfer 
programs because the increase in resources does not necessarily go to targeted 
individuals due to family reallocation. One of the underlying reasons is that intra-
household resource allocation can be a function of technology (ability to turn marginal 
calories into income) and preferences (Haddad et al., 1995). I will explore if families 
will preferentially allocate health-related resources to relatively more vulnerable family 
members or away from them, as family resource constraints decrease through higher 
income. The effect will be measured in the form of BMI share among household 
members.   
In this paper I will also explore whether Kuznets curve exists between intra-household 
inequality and measurement of well-being (household average BMI). Kuznets’s 
seminal work (1955) proposes an inverted-U relationship between income inequality 
and income development. The hypothesis claims that countries in the beginning stage 
 115 
 
of economic growth have little inequality, and the inequality widens as the economic 
development, and begins to decline when reaching a certain level of growth. The 
hypothesis is tested by many researchers using different countries’ data, and the results 
show both supportive and contradictory evidence. 
 
Literature Review 
Decision-making inside families determines resource distribution among family 
members. Many in the literature including Browning, Chiappori and Weiss (2014) 
discuss the complex decision-making processes and their internal mechanism. The 
dominate analytical approach, the unitary model of household maximizes the family 
utility function under single budget constraint. Other models include cooperative and 
non-cooperative models. Various distribution approaches induce intra-household well-
being inequalities in health outcome; BMI in our case. Kanbur (2016) explains that the 
unitary model causes intra-household inequality because the family utility function is 
not necessarily inequality averse, while inequality rises in Nash bargaining game under 
cooperative model. Empirically, the unitary model that implies equal shares contrasts 
with the implications of cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining models (Browning 
and Chiappori, 1998; McElroy, 1990). Inevitably, unequal allocation of family 
resources causes intra-household inequality.     
Many previous works regarding intra-household inequality find the overall 
inequality/poverty is underestimated and the result of poverty reduction is overstated 
because intra-household inequality is ignored. An empirical analysis on food intake 
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survey in the Philippines by Haddad and Kanbur (1990) show inequality in calorie 
adequacy could err by 30% or more comparing the individual level result and the 
household level result. Lise and Seitz (2011) use the collective model to estimate 
consumption inequality in the U.K. They find adult equivalence scale assuming no 
inequality among household members provides an inaccurate representation of 
individual consumption and underestimation of individual consumption inequality by 
25% to 50%. Dunbar et al. (2013) and Bargain et al. (2014) use the conventional 
Rothbarth method (Rothbarth, 1943) to prove that ignoring intra-household distribution 
of resources leads to a large underestimation of child poverty. Kanbur (2016) mentioned 
when we look at the surveys that collect data only on family level, individual 
consumption or expenditure is calculated based on family consumption. The individual 
consumption is calculated by dividing family consumption by family members, 
sometimes equally and sometimes by other weights; -- and using equalized individual 
consumption would lead to underestimated total inequality. According to Kanbur the 
underestimation can account for 25% to 65% of the total inequality/poverty. Kanbur 
also claims that intra-household resource allocation influences the effect of minimum 
wage rise and hence intra-household inequality influences labor policies. Haddad 
(1992), Kanbur (1993), Hoddinott (2009) and Shi (2012) state intra-household 
reallocation affects the result of public programs. Public programs targeting the 
improvement of total welfare-- for example, school meal subsidy-- may not be able to 
achieve their intended goal because of intra-household transfer. Haddad and Kanbur 
(1993) use numerical calculation to show that considering intra-household inequality 
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when designing the programs to target at nutritional deficiency would lead to sizable 
improvement of the result.  
As for intra-household health inequality, Roemling and Qaim (2013) find in Indonesia, 
intra-household inequality rises from 1997 to 2012, especially among the overweight. 
Residence in an urban location, number of children, education of household head, and 
per capita consumption/expenditures increase intra-household nutritional inequality. 
The study in Coates et al. (2018) reveals significant intra-household nutrient inequities 
in rural Ethiopian households. And inequities are greatest for ‘invisible’ nutrients like 
microelement iron rather than protein and fat. 
Sahn and Younger (2009) measure intra-household health inequality by calculating 
mean log deviation of BMI. They apply household survey data across 15 years in 7 
developing countries and find 55% to 71% of total health inequality attributable to 
within household health inequality (value varies depending on the value of α in the 
Generalized Entropy). In their work they explain the advantages of using BMI as the 
indicator of well-being, including individual-level and relatively easy measurement, 
reflecting both food and non-food health-influencing factors, and random measure error. 
They reject the hypothesis of intra-household or inter-country Kuznets curve. Instead 
they find positive relationship between BMI inequality and wellbeing (measured in 
mean household BMI). On the other hand, they find no relationship between BMI 
inequality and per capita expenditure. This result consists with Haddad and Kanbur 
(1990) and Haddad et al. (1995). The study also explores the BMI ratios among family 
members. They find in the least advantageous families children tend to have the highest 
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BMI because parents may want to protect the most vulnerable family member. When 
family budget constraint is relaxed, the parent-to-child BMI ratio is about 1 and 
increases with the wealth level. 
 
Methods 
My article uses the same approach as Sahn and Younger (2009) to measure intra-
household health inequality by calculating mean log deviation of BMI. 
a. Inequality Measurement 
I use Theil’s mean log deviation, which is also the generalized entropy with α=0 as the 
measurement of inequality. One advantage of mean log deviation over other inequality 
measurement like Gini coefficient is its decomposability, so we can divide total 
inequality into within group inequality and between group inequality. Population inside 
the same group share some identical characteristics, for example, rural-urban division 
groups population into rural and urban subgroups. We can estimate inequalities in 
groups with different characteristics and compare with overall inequality. One 
economic concept developed on decomposability is inequality of opportunity (Roemer, 
1993), which is between group inequality (groups with different circumstance factors) 
while normalizing within group inequality (assuming outcome only affected by 
personal effort under identical circumstances in the same group). 
Let n individual divide into G mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups. Let the 
i𝑡ℎ (𝑖 = 1, 2, … 𝑛𝑔)  individual in the g𝑡ℎ (g = 1, 2, … G)  group have income or 
consumption 𝑦𝑖,𝑔 . The population share is represented by 𝑥𝑔 and sums to 1. 𝑚𝑔 
denotes the group mean and m denotes the overall mean. If replacing 𝑦𝑖,𝑔 by the group 
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mean in each group, the inequality inside the group is suppressed into 0 and only leaves 
the between group inequality. Denoted inequality I, we can get within inequality 𝐼𝑤 =
𝐼 − 𝐼𝐵. 
The mean log deviation can be expressed as:  
L =
1
𝑛
∑ ∑ log (
𝑚
𝑦𝑖𝑔
) 
= 𝐿𝑊 + 𝐿𝐵 
= ∑ 𝑥𝑔𝐿𝑔 + ∑ 𝑥𝑔 log (
𝑚
𝑚𝑔
) 
where the within group MLD is the weighted sum of group MLDs. 
In our case, the variable of interest is BMI rather than income, thus the province level 
inequality for a given province k can be expressed as:  
I(k) =
1
𝑁𝑘
∑ ln (
𝜇𝑘
𝐵𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑘
) 
where 𝑁𝑘 represents the sample size in province k, 𝜇𝑘 stands for the mean BMI in 
province k, and 𝐵𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑘 means the BMI of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ person in the sample.  
We can decompose provincial inequality into intra-household and between household 
inequality in the same way. In this case, K represents the number of households, 
k=1,2,…K, 𝑁𝑘 stands for the number of family members in household, 𝑁 expresses 
the total sample size, 𝐼(𝑘) is the inequality of household k, 𝜇 represents average BMI 
in the total sample, and 𝜇𝑘 is the mean BMI in the household. The first term on the 
right-hand-side defines within household inequality and the latter term is between 
household inequality. Household with 𝐼(𝑘)=0 has no intra-household inequality but 
still contribute to total inequality through between household inequality.  
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I(total) = ∑
𝑁𝑘
𝑁
𝐾
𝑘=1
[𝐼(𝑘)] +
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑁𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
ln (
𝜇
𝜇𝑘
) 
b. Health Indicator 
In this article I follow Sahn and Younger (2009)’s approach to use BMI as measurement 
of well-being. The distribution of BMI differs by age and sex for people under 20 and 
it has a unified standard for 20 and above. Hence, I standardize BMI for all sex and age 
groups by a fixed reference group, which is 19-year-old (228 month) male in our case.  
𝐵𝑀𝐼 = 𝐹?̅?,?̅?
−1(𝐹𝑎,𝑠(𝑏𝑚𝑖)) 
where F26 is the distribution function of BMI that World Health Organization defined 
reference population by age and sex. a stands for age, s stands for sex and bmi is the 
actual collected BMI. In this case, ?̅? =19 and ?̅? =male. The standardized BMI is 
calculated by finding the position of the individual actual BMI in the distribution of the 
specific age and sex group’s BMI distribution, and then find the value of that percentile 
in the BMI distribution for 19-year-old male. Note in the standardization, the reference 
group can be chosen in any sex and age. Although different age and sex group has 
different BMI distribution, I do not intend to calculate the absolute value of inequality. 
Rather, I try to find out what proportion of within group inequality attributes to the total 
inequality, in a relative measurement scale. Hence choosing different age/sex group 
does not affect the robustness of the analysis.  
Sahn and Younger (2009) claims standardized BMI is an attractive representative of 
                                                   
26 WHO Multicentre Growth Reference Study Group. WHO Child Growth Standards: 
Length/height-for-age, weight-for-age, weight-for-length, weight-for-height and body mass 
index-for-age: Methods and development. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2006 (p229-
297, p301-304). 
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well-being over consumption and income. It reflects and only reflects individual level 
well-being, and family member cannot deprive each other’s BMI (at least not directly). 
Income and expenditure reflect both individual and household level well-being because 
of the arbitrary rule applied in the measurement, and expenditure usually involves 
public good inside a household. In addition, individual-level consumption measurement 
may be subject to measurement error which could be caused by survey design, interview, 
recall periods, and price deflation (Deaton and Grosh, 2000; Pradhan, 2001).  
Alternative health indicators that reflects individual level consumption include caloric 
intake (Kanbur and Haddad, 1992; Haddad et al., 1995) but this indictor is potentially 
problematic considering the difficulty of data collection and processing. Many nutrition 
surveys, like CHNS, collect food intake data by either asking interviewers to recall their 
food consumption and or having recorders to observe and record food consumption 
condition. However, food leftover, false recall 27 , inaccurate estimation, improper 
prediction may affect the accuracy of these data. In addition, comparing individual food 
consumption with different demographic backgrounds is unfair because people in 
different age, height, occupations, geographic location, health status may differ in needs 
for caloric intake although these could be standardized in a manner similar to the BMI 
data. Furthermore, BMI reflects cumulative nutrition intake in a longer term, and thus 
may avoid inaccuracies introduced by short-term fluctuations in food consumption. 
Other health measurements like happiness, activities, mortality, morbidity, life 
expectancy and height are infeasible for this study because they are either ordinal, 
                                                   
27 del Ninno et al. (2001) find memory about food is likely to distort beyond 24-48 hours. 
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discrete, inaccurate, not standardized across sex and age groups, or strongly affected by 
other factors. 
BMI is a positive, cardinal and continuous measurement. The calculation only involves 
height and weight which is direct and simple. The data collected on height and weight 
is considered accurate with random errors, unlike income whose error may be correlated 
to other variables. BMI reflects individual absorption of food and non-food resources 
like sanitary conditions and access to medical care, and it reflects consumption 
according to personal needs.  
The major problem of using BMI is the double thresholds of the health sector. BMI 
value inside a specific interval is considered healthy. Either underweight or obesity 
indicates some health problem. Another problem of using BMI as health indicator is 
that it does not directly reflect illness. In addition, BMI can only reflect inequality 
related to partial food and health consumption, but it could not reflect other 
consumption inequality such as education expenditure. In our case, the sample I used 
in 12 Chinese provinces shows relatively low obesity rates (obesity: BMI>=3028, 3% 
in sample, see the last column in Table 1) and food consumption accounts for a large 
proportion in total consumption in developing countries so I BMI still effectively 
represents a reasonable indication of well-being.       
c. Kuznets Curve Estimation 
Kuznets (1955) argues that aggregate inequality in a country-level population displays 
                                                   
28 Division of Nutrition, Physical Activity, and Obesity, National Center for Chronic Disease 
Prevention and Health Promotion: If your BMI is 30.0 or higher, it falls within the obese range. 
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an inverted-U shape as economy develops. In the early stage of economic growth, the 
inequality increase, up to some point it improves with the further economic growth. 
Much research tests the theory across various countries and time period, and they get 
different results. Paukert (1973) supports the theory while Ravallion (2005) finds the 
relationship not convincing enough. As for health inequality, Haddad et al. (1995) apply 
data from Philippines to prove the common preference model generates an inverted-U 
relationship between unadjusted intra-household inequality of calorie intake and mean 
household intake, but adjusted calorie intakes display a much weaker pattern. The direct 
testing does not support the inverted-U relationship.    
The Kuznets curve maps average income level against income inequality. In our case, 
it maps average household BMI against intra-household BMI inequality. Most 
researchers use the combination of observation and testing for the parametric estimator 
for the quadric function to investigate the inverted-U shape of the Kuznets curve. The 
non-parametric way tests inequalities in 3 different intervals: the 5th-15th percentile, the 
45th-55th percentile, and 85th-95th percentile. If the middle interval has obvious larger 
inequality than two tails, then we consider the curve has an inverted-U shape. If the 
inverted-U shape holds, then we can infer that the intra-household BMI inequality is 
low when average BMI is low, so the family distribute food equally among family 
members in order to survive. The intra-household BMI inequality gets larger as average 
BMI increase, and it comes back to small disparity as average household BMI fall into 
health category (in a large number but smaller than 30). If the graph shows positive-U 
shape, it infers nutrition deprivation (large inequality) occurs in resource limited 
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households (with low average BMI). 
d. Quadratic least square regression  
The visual inspection does not show a linear relationship between intra-household BMI 
inequality and mean household BMI (Figure 1), hence I follow Shan & Younger (2009) 
and assume a quadratic relationship: 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,  
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents intra-household BMI inequality for household i in year t, x stands 
for mean household BMI. The sign for β2 is positive when the model is convex and 
negative when the curve is concave. We can test the null hypothesis that the regression 
function is linear against the alternative hypothesis that it is quadratic by obtaining t 
value.  
When using a calibration model for quantitation, the curve must be continuous, 
continuously differentiable and monotonic over the calibration range. To test the 
adequacy of OLS model, we need to test for the normality, multicollinearity, model 
specification, and homoscedasticity. Normality of residuals is only required for valid 
hypothesis testing and is not required in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the 
regression coefficients. There is no multi-collinearity problem in our model because we 
only have one independent variable. A model specification error can occur when one or 
more relevant variables are omitted from the model or one or more irrelevant variables 
are included in the model. If relevant variables are omitted from the model, the common 
variance they share with included variables may be wrongly attributed to those 
variables, and the error term is inflated. On the other hand, if irrelevant variables are 
included in the model, the common variance they share with included variables may be 
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wrongly attributed to them. Model specification errors can substantially affect the 
estimate of regression coefficients. OLS assumes that the variance of the error term is 
constant (homoskedasticity). If the error terms do not have constant variance, they are 
said to be heteroskedastic. If this variance is not constant, then the linear regression 
model has heteroscedastic errors and likely to give incorrect estimates. However, 
heteroskedasticity does not result in biased parameter estimates. Violation of the OLS 
assumptions will result in overestimated confidence intervals and underestimated p-
value, and thus the statistical significance level of the independent variable may also be 
overestimated. 
 
Data 
Data used for this study comes from China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS)29 , an 
ongoing project that covers 12 provinces differing in geographical location, economic 
development and nature resource endowment in China. This project is implemented by 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Chinese Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention collaboratively. The survey uses random cluster, multistage, and 
weighted sampling scheme to draw country samples in each province. More than 4,400 
households and 19,000 individuals are covered by the survey, with a high follow up 
rate. The survey is stratified into individual, family and community level, and I use 
                                                   
29 This research uses data from China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). We thank the 
National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety, China Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Carolina Population Center, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the NIH (R01-
HD30880, DK056350, and R01-HD38700) and the Fogarty International Center, NIH for financial 
support for the CHNS data collection and analysis files from 1989 to 2006 and both parties plus 
the China-Japan Friendship Hospital, Ministry of Health for support for CHNS 2009 and future 
surveys. 
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individual survey and household survey in this study. The survey covers topics 
including nutrition and physical examination, health service, social economical 
background, food access, farm production, income and expenditure, family relationship, 
time allocation at home, media exposure, etc. and each panel is linked by individual ID 
and household ID. Unfortunately, there are no weights30 to adjust the data to make 
them representative for China due to the original survey design . Liaoning Province 
exits survey in 1997 when Heilongjiang Province takes its place and participates since 
then. Mega cities including Beijing, Shanghai and Chongqing were added in 2011. 
CHNS records data starting from 1989 and updates to 2015. Since most panels I use in 
the analysis are only updated to 2011, this study analyzed only 9 years of data: 1989, 
1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011 (Table 1). Each valid entry includes 
variables like personal ID, family ID, survey wave, province, height, weight, and family 
member identifier (whether the individual is mother, father or child in the family).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
30 “Weights for CHNS”, Barry M Popkin 
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Table III.1: Surveys, Sample sizes, Shares of overweight and obese individuals in each 
sample for available years from 1989 to 2011 
Province Observations Obesity 
rate 
Overweight 
rate 
Beijing (11) 1279 8.37% 34.01% 
Liaoning (89 91 93 00 04 06 09 11) 9278 4.34% 23.12% 
Heilongjiang (97 00 04 06 09 11)  7123 3.41% 23.84% 
Shanghai (11) 1466 4.91% 30.49% 
Jiangsu (89 91 93 97 00 04 06 09 11) 11368 2.77% 20.66% 
Shandong (89 91 93 97 00 04 06 09 11) 10258 5.14% 28.46% 
Henan (89 91 93 97 00 04 06 09 11) 10814 3.84% 21.19% 
Hubei (89 91 93 97 00 04 06 09 11) 10916 2.45% 15.05% 
Hunan (89 91 93 97 00 04 06 09 11) 11180 2.16% 15.10% 
Guangxi (89 91 93 97 00 04 06 09 11) 12930 1.09% 9.67% 
Guizhou (89 91 93 97 00 04 06 09 11) 12703 1.69% 11.44% 
Chongqing (11) 1291 5.42% 23.47% 
Total 100605 3.00% 18.51% 
Note: 25 BMI 30, overweight; BMI>=30, obese  
Source: National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion and 
CHNS 1989-2011 
When calculating the adjusted BMI, I exclude individual who is pregnant or lacking 
limbs because these conditions can impair the measurement accuracy. I also exclude 
extreme values which are out of 4 standard deviation from the overall sample mean 
(some individuals, especially infants, leaving height or weight blank will cause extreme 
value). In practice, deleting the extremes has no effect on non-parametric estimates 
(Robinson et al., 2005).  
I assume an even split of income among family members and use income per capita as 
another indicator of well-being in a later part of this study analyzing household member 
shares of BMI. In CHNS survey, the household income is calculated from direct 
questionnaire response about income, summation of market and non-market activities, 
including nonmonetary government subsidies, and reposes to questions about 
expenditures. The advanced method makes the income data better quality but deviates 
 128 
 
from China Statistical Yearbook. Chen et al. (2007) find income unadjusted for inflation 
more consist with national statistics than adjusted income. Another well-being 
measurement, Consumer Price Index is also available in adjusted and unadjusted form. 
However, China’s CPI excludes housing price during calculation and considering 
housing occupies a large portion of household expenditure, this variable is not used to 
measure household economic status. Wagstaff et al. (2003) uses expenditure as the 
social economic status measure. This study uses income instead of expenditure because 
of limited reporting of expenditure data. The response rate for expenditure is low in the 
data set and including too many 0 entries severally impact the data sensitivity. 
 
Findings 
I find no evidence of intra-household or cross provincial Kuznets curve. I find no clear 
pattern of family member deprivation measured by BMI ratio, and male-to-child, 
female-to-child and male-to-female BMI ratio all show symmetrical distribution 
against y=1, hence no specific group is more advantaged in BMI measurement. 
Nevertheless, the intra-household inequality accounts for more than 50% of the overall 
BMI inequality. 
a. Intra-household Kuznets curve 
I map non-parametric regression for samples of all households in 12 provinces, with 
mean household BMI ordered from the lowest to highest on the x-axis and intra-
household inequality measured in mean log deviation on the y-axis (Figure III.1). 
Visually the curve seems to have an inverted-U shape, and parametric regression (Table 
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III.3) showing negative quadratic coefficient is supportive to the observation. However, 
the coefficient is very small that the line is almost flat, and the R square is also very 
small, suggesting a weak fit. The three test points (Table III.2) tell the opposite story, 
which suggests in the BMI distribution, individuals in the middle range have less 
inequality than the extremes. 
 
 
Figure III.1. Intra-household BMI inequality and household well-being, all provinces 
pooled, order by mean household BMI for available from 1898 to 2011. 
Source: CHNS1989-2011 
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Table III.2. Statistical comparisons of test points of intra-household inequality for 
available years from 1898 to 2011. 
  10th vs 50th percentile 50th vs 90th percentile 
Beijing D I 
Liaoning D I 
Heilongjiang D I 
Shanghai D I 
Jiangsu D I 
Shandong D I 
Henan D I 
Hubei D I 
Hunan D I 
Guangxi D I 
Guizhou D I 
Chongqing D I 
All provinces D I 
Note: I is an increase and D is a decrease. 
Source: CHNS1989-2011 and author’s calculation 
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Table III.3. Quadratic least square regression: relationship between intra-household inequality and mean household BMI for available years from 
1898 to 2011. 
VARIABLES all Beijing Liaoning Heilongjiang   Shanghai Jiangsu 
Mean household BMI 0.00411 0.00385 0.00396 0.00312   0.00608 0.00394 
 [40.56] [3.16] [11.44] [7.53] [5.15] [12.19] 
Mean household BMI^2 -7.92-e-05 -7.24-e-05 -7.63-e-05 -6.11e-05 -0.000124 -7.46e-05 
 [-36.57] [-2.98] [-10.55] [-7.05]  [-5.10] [-10.79] 
Constant -0.0467 -0.0442 -0.0450 -0.0341   -0.0682 -0.0455 
 [-39.70] [-2.92] [-10.94] [ -6.91]  [-4.77] [-12.10] 
Observations 100,605 1,279 9,278 7,123   1,466 11,368 
R-squared 0.04 0.013 0.028 0.014   0.018 0.043 
 
VARIABLES Shandong Henan Hubei Hunan   Guangxi Guizhou Chongqing 
Mean household BMI 0.00471 0.00457 0.00472 0.00357   0.00257 0.00529 -0.00172 
 [14.17] [14.21] [17.01] [8.92]  [7.86] [17.24] [-1.12] 
Mean household BMI^2 -9.15e-05 -8.67e-05 -9.21e-05 -6.43e-05 -4.41e-05 -0.000103 3.99e-05 
 [-13.49] [-12.86] [-15.36] [-7.36] [-5.93] [-15.32] [1.24] 
Constant -0.0545 -0.0533 -0.0541 -0.0421   -0.0297 -0.0608 0.0249 
 [-13.44] [-13.96] [-16.93] [-9.24]  [-8.29] [-17.45] [1.34] 
Observations 10,258 10,814 10,916 11,180   12,929 12,703 1,291 
R-squared 0.026 0.043 0.059 0.049   0.055 0.060 0.003 
Notes: Robust t statistics in brackets; variables with bold text have 5% statistical significance level or better. Due to violation of OLS assumptions 
in model test, the significance level may be overestimated.  
Source: CHNS1989-2011 and author’s calculation based on 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
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Like the overall result, whether there appears an inverted-U shape curve is 
undetermined for provincial results (Figure III.2). The parametric quadratic coefficients 
are negative and statistically significant for all provinces except for Chongqing, but still, 
the value is small, and the model fits poorly with a very small R square. On the contrary, 
the test points result demonstrates a positive U shape.  
As mentioned in Methods section, we need to test the OLS model due to various reasons. 
Normality test (Figure III.A1 in appendix) indicates the residual is not normally 
distributed, thus the standard errors of OLS estimates is not perfectly reliable, which 
means the confidence intervals would be too wide or narrow. However, normality is not 
required in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the regression coefficients. The model 
specification test (Figure III.A2 in appendix) has a statistically significant p-value and 
we have to reject the null hypothesis. The result indicates that there exist omitted 
variables that could have better define the model. I expect model specification errors 
because I only have one dependent variable in the regression. The Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity (Figure III.A2 in appendix) shows a 
statistically significant p-value and we have to accept the alternative hypothesis that the 
residual variance is not homogenous. Cross-sectional studies are more likely to have 
heteroscedasticity because they often have values differ in a big range. While 
heteroscedasticity does not cause bias in the coefficient estimates, it does make them 
less precise and further from the correct population value. Heteroscedasticity increases 
the variance of the coefficient estimates and tends to produce p-values that are smaller 
than the actual value, and in turn a statistically important coefficient could be not 
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statistically important. Thus, the statistical significance of the reported coefficients 
should be interpreted with caution, because the estimated confidence intervals may be 
too small in most cases. Overall, whether there exists a relationship between well-being 
measured in mean household BMI and intra-household inequality is uncertain. 
b. Cross-province result 
In this section I present the BMI analog to the original Kuznets curve and explore the 
relationship between intra-province BMI inequality and well-being indicators 
(provincial mean BMI and mean income per capita). I also exam whether it exits linear 
relationship or quadratic relationship. I plot the well-being measurement against intra-
province BMI inequality calculated in mean log deviation (Figure III.3). The parametric 
estimation (Table III.4) shows positive linear relationship between inequality and well-
being measurements, both in mean BMI and mean income, indicating inequality 
increase with living condition. However, both coefficient value and R square are very 
low, and the trend is close to a flat line, indicating very weak relationship between 
inequality and well-being (Figure III.3). On the other hand, the quadratic estimators are 
negative, but only statistically significant when it comes to income. Also the very low 
R square indicates very weak relationship. Because there are only 12 observations, it is 
hard to say if there exits any relationship between cross provincial inequality and well-
being.
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Figure III.2 (a)~(l). Provincial intra-household BMI inequality by mean BMI for 
available years from 1898 to 2011. 
Source: CHNS 1989-2011
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure III.3. Cross-provincial relationship between BMI inequality and well-being 
represented by (a) mean provincial BMI and (b) mean income per capita for available 
years from 1898 to 2011. 
Source: CHNS 1989-2011 
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Table III.4. Cross province regression: relationship between intra-household BMI and 
well-being for available from 1898 to 2011. 
 Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear 
Mean BMI 0.0122 0.0004   
 [1.79 ] [2.63]   
Mean BMI squared -0.0003    
 [ -1.73]    
Mean income per capita   3.24E-07 1.83E-08 
   [2.27] [0.72] 
Mean income per capita square   -1.03E-11  
   [ -2.17]  
Constant -0.134 0.0002 0.0085 0.01 
 [-1.72] [0.05] [12.58] [32.84] 
Observations 12 12 12 12 
R-squared 0.56 0.41 0.24 0.05 
Notes: t statistics in brackets; variables with bold text have 5% statistical significance 
level or better. Due to violation of OLS assumptions in model test, the significance level 
may be overestimated. 
Source: CHNS 1989-2011  
 
c. Household member shares of BMI 
In order to access whether families will preferentially allocate health- related resources 
to relatively more vulnerable family members, I compare the BMI ratios among family 
members, ordering families from the least to the most advantageous in well-being, 
represented by mean household BMI and income per capita separately. I conclude there 
is almost no differences among family member’s BMI. 
Sahn and Younger (2009) find declining and flat (fe)male-to-child BMI ratios and 
households with low BMIs usually have ratios above 1 while households with high 
BMIs have ratios above 1. Their result suggests adults allocate health related resources 
to children in low level well-being status. Once the resource limitation is relaxed adults 
will gain more weight. However, in our research, the relationship between mean well-
being level and adult-to-child BMI ratio is not clear. The result display almost flat and 
 142 
 
slightly declining father-to-child and mother-to-child BMI ratio as mean household 
BMI increases(Figures III.4 and III.5). The data points assemble into a cluster rather 
than displaying a clear linear relationship. The graphs are basically symmetrical around 
a ratio of 1. This result is consistent with Haddad et al. (2003) and Ssewanyana et al. 
(2008)’s findings that nutritional outcomes only has modest correlation with household 
resources in developing countries.  
Also of interest is how BMI differences among family members change as economic 
status improves, whether resource-constrained families protect or deprive children and 
women. Sahn and Younger (2009) find declining and flat relative BMI for children as 
expenditure per capita increases in less developed countries. They also note in the 
household with lowest expenditure children have the highest BMI relative to adult male 
and female because adults try to protect the most venerable young children with limited 
resources. In China, flat and slightly decreasing father-to-child and mother-to-child 
BMI ratio exist, which distribute almost symmetrically against y=1 line (Figures III.6 
and III.7). Amongst the families with the lowest income, both high ratio which suggests 
deprivation and low ratio indicating resource allocation towards children occur, in half 
and half.   
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Figure III.4 (a)~(l). Father-to-child BMI ratio ordered by mean household BMI for 
available years from 1898 to 2011. 
Source: CHNS1989-2011 
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Figure III.5 (a)~(l). Mother-to-child BMI ratio ordered by mean household BMI for 
available years from 1898 to 2011. 
Source: CHNS1989-2011 
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(l) 
Figure III.6 (a)~(l). Father-to-child BMI ratio ordered by per capita income for available 
years from 1898 to 2011. 
Source: CHNS1989-2011 
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Figure III.7 (a)~(l). Mother to child BMI ratio ordered by per capita income for 
available years from 1898 to 2011. 
Source: CHNS1989-2011 
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Figure III.8 (a)~(l). Male head to spouse BMI ratio ordered by mean household BMI 
for available years from 1898 to 2011. 
Source: CHNS1989-2011 
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Figure III.9 (a)~(l). Male head to spouse BMI ratio ordered by per capita income for 
available years from 1898 to 2011. 
Source: CHNS1989-2011 
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Similarly, father-to-mother BMI ratios do not show strong linear patterns as well-being 
indictors increase and they distribute evenly around a ratio of 1. Our finding is thus 
consistent with Sahn and Younger (2009). 
Overall, deprivation among household members exists, but appears as a very weak 
relationship with well-being indicators. In example of father-to-child BMI ratios, half  
of the households in the sample show fathers have higher BMIs than children which 
suggesting fathers enjoy better health-related resources, while another half indicates the 
opposite. 
d. Inequality Decomposition  
I decompose overall inequality into intra-household inequality and between household 
inequality (Table III.5). Over half of the total health inequality is attributable to within 
household inequality. In 3 mega cities, Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing intra-
household inequality rates are at around 60%. This result is consistent with previous 
literatures measuring the percentage of intra-household inequality. The result is 
empirically important because it demonstrates that omitting intra-household inequality 
will underestimate the real inequality by more than a half and hence largely impair the 
accuracy of inequality measurement and the effectiveness of policies. 
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Table III.5. Decomposition of total inequality into within versus between household 
inequality for available years from 1898 to 2011. 
  between(%) within(%) between within 
Beijing 39.83% 60.17% 0.00412 0.00622 
Liaoning 50.80% 49.20% 0.00551 0.00534 
Heilongjiang 46.97% 53.03% 0.00462 0.00521 
Shanghai 39.29% 60.71% 0.00385 0.00596 
Jiangsu 47.35% 52.65% 0.00469 0.00522 
Shandong 46.81% 53.19% 0.00465 0.00528 
Henan 46.72% 53.28% 0.00485 0.00553 
Hubei 51.07% 48.93% 0.00508 0.00487 
Hunan 44.42% 55.58% 0.00413 0.00517 
Guangxi 45.40% 54.60% 0.00408 0.00491 
Guizhou 45.06% 54.94% 0.00413 0.00503 
Chongqing 40.98% 59.02% 0.00457 0.00658 
All provinces 50.21% 49.79% 0.00525 0.00520 
Source: CHNS1989-2011 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
This article explores intra-household health inequality by BMI. I find no evidence of 
intra-household or cross provincial Kuznets curve. I find no clear pattern of family 
member deprivation measured by BMI ratio, and no specific group (father, mother or 
children) is more advantaged in BMI measurement. Nevertheless, the intra-household 
inequality accounts for more than 50% of the overall BMI inequality. 
BMI is an adequate measurement because it reflects individual level consumption of 
health-related food and non-food resources relative to personal need, and it also shares 
the advantages like non-zero positive value, easy collection and simple computation. 
However, using BMI has its limitations. Although I justified the reason of using BMI 
as well-being indicator in China (and other similar developing countries), it may be an 
inappropriate measurement in countries with high rate of obesity and food waste. One 
possible problem of using BMI as health indicator in China is the prevalence of women 
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underweight. Studies show increasing fraction of Chinese women prefer slim body 
shape due to cultural norm and social environment, and adolescents in both genders 
appear to show relatively high percentage of underweight. (Chen and Shi, 2013). To the 
extent that more women choose to be slim, inequality in BMI does not necessarily 
reflect the inequality in access to the resources inside the family. 
I do not find convincing evidence of a BMI Kuznets curve. The analysis applying 
CHNS data shows whether there exists a relationship (either quadratic or linear) 
between well-being measured in mean household BMI and intra-household inequality 
is uncertain. Our analysis shows no statistically significant correlation between 
individual BMI and income/expenditure per capita, which differs from Sahn and 
Younger (2009)’s finding which BMI is positively related to mean household BMI. 
Cross provincial relationship between inequality and well-being is inconclusive 
because of inadequate sample number. BMI ratios amongst household members show 
very weak relationship with well-being indicators, and they distribute almost 
symmetrically around ratio 1 as well-being conditions improve. The decomposition 
result proves intra-household inequality accounts for more than a half of total health 
inequality, thus suggests assuming equal household member well-being significantly 
underestimates the total inequality. Underestimation of real inequality should draw 
attention of policymakers because it could imply overestimating the effectiveness of 
inequality reduction policies or programs.  
Policymakers should also not ignore intra-household health inequality because it could 
affect the possible outcomes of public transfer programs and increase of minimum wage. 
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The pattern of intra-household resource (re)allocation influence how much of the 
transfer or rise of minimum wage actually goes to the target individual. Sahn and 
Gerstle (2004)’s study show transfer payments to women affects family expenditure 
patterns. An interesting finding by Roemling and Qaim (2013) claim families with 
female household heads have significantly lower levels of nutritional inequality.  
Further studies could develop on explaining the descriptive findings from this study, 
and discussing possible policies aiming to mitigate intra-household health inequality. 
The targets of such programs could be the least advantageous induvial without 
sufficient nutrition reflected in BMI inside households. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Figure III.A1. Normality test for OLS regression of intra-household BMI inequality on mean 
household BMI and mean household BMI square, all provinces pooled, for years available, 
1989-2011. 
 
 
 
 
Figure III.A2. Model specification and homoscedasticity test for OLS regression of 
intra-household BMI inequality on mean household BMI and mean household BMI 
square all provinces pooled, for years available, 1989-2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       resid      100,605     0.0000        0.0000           .              .
                                                                             
    Variable          Obs  Pr(Skewness)  Pr(Kurtosis) adj chi2(2)   Prob>chi2
                                                                 joint       
                    Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality
. sktest resid
. predict resid, residuals
                                                                              
       _cons     .0021126   .0001746    12.10   0.000     .0017704    .0024547
      _hatsq     114.8341   8.379871    13.70   0.000     98.40967    131.2586
        _hat    -.0340071   .0770014    -0.44   0.659    -.1849288    .1169146
                                                                              
mean_log_d~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total      3.441564   100,604  .000034209   Root MSE        =    .00572
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0422
    Residual    3.29639349   100,602  .000032767   R-squared       =    0.0422
       Model    .145170512         2  .072585256   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(2, 100602)    =   2215.22
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =   100,605
. linktest
                  Prob > F =      0.0000
              F(3, 100599) =     75.83
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of mean_log_deviation
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =  4247.14
         Variables: fitted values of mean_log_deviation
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
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